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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-DAMAGES IN A MARITIME COLLISION

OR STRANDING

CAUSED BY MUTUAL FAULT MUST BE APPORTIONED ACCORDING TO THE
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PARTIES

Plaintiff, the Reliable Transfer Company, sued the United
States' to recover one-half the amount of damage to plaintiffs
tanker caused by its grounding on a breakwater on which the Coast
Guard maintained a light. The captain of the tanker knew that the
light was not in operation on that night and that visibility was
poor; 2 nonetheless he executed a turn and changed course without
consulting any of the navigational aids available to him. Due to his
miscalculation of the tanker's position, the vessel ran aground on
the breakwater. Plaintiff contended that the failure of the Coast
Guard to maintain the light was a contributing cause of the
grounding, so that under the settled rule in cases of collision and
stranding caused by mutual fault, the damages to the tanker
should be divided equally between the parties. The district court
found, and the court of appeals affirmed, that although the plaintiff contributed seventy-five per cent and the defendant only
twenty-five per cent to causing the accident, the traditional rule
dictated that each was liable for one-half of the damages, since
both were at fault.3 The Supreme Court held, however, that the
judgment be vacated. The rule of equal division of property damage in a maritime collision or stranding caused by mutual fault is
replaced by a rule of apportionment of damages among the parties
according to their comparative faults, allowing equal division only
when the parties are equally at fault or when fault cannot be fairly
apportioned. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397,
95 S.Ct. 1708 (1975).
The rule of divided damages has its origins in the maritime codes
that were the foundation of the admiralty laws of most nations.4
1. Plaintiff sued under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 741 et seq.
(1970) and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1345 et seq. (1970).
2. About one-half hour before the tanker approached the breakwater, the
captain observed that the light was not in operation. Visibility was impaired that
night by eight- to ten-foot waves caused by the gale force wind.
3. 497 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1974).
4. This rule is found in the Laws of Oleron, which are thought to date from

the twelfth century. This code was referred to as the law of English admiralty in
the fourteenth century. Staring, Contributionand Division of Damages on Admi-
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Originally, damages were divided equally when a court could not
determine which party was at fault in a collision.5 By the nineteenth century, the English courts applied the rule consistently in
collisions between two vessels involving mutual fault.6 When the
Supreme Court of the United States formally adopted the rule in
The Schooner Catherinev. Dickinson,7 the Court premised its decision on both the widespread acceptance of the rule by the lower
federal courts and considerations of equity and fairness.8 The
Schooner Catherine held simply that a finding of mutual fault in
a collision between two vessels compels the application of the divided damages rule; however, by changing the burden of proof and
presumptions governing the finding of mutual fault, the Supreme
Court later expanded the scope of the rule in The Pennsylvania.9
The Court there held that a party who at the time of the collision
is in violation of a statute designed to prevent collisions has the
burden of showing that his statutory fault was not a cause of the
ralty and Maritime Cases, 45 CALF. L. REV. 304, 306 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Staring]. The rule may also be found in the codes of the Hanse Towns, Wisby,
and the Consolato del Mare. Id. Staring's article traces the development of the
divided damages rule. Its history is also detailed in R. MARSDEN, 4 BRrISH SHIPPING LAWS: COLLISIONS AT SEA §§ 119-37 (11th ed. 1961).

5. Staring, supra note 4, at 308.
6. The Woodrop-Sims, 165 Eng. Rep. 1422 (Adm. 1815) (dictum); Hay v.
LeNeve, 2 Shaw Scotch App. Cas. 395 (1824), cited in Staring, supra note 4, at
310.
7. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854).
8. "The rule that prevails in the district and circuit courts, we understand,
has been to divide the loss ....
"Under the circumstances usually attending these disasters, we think the rule
dividing the loss the most just and equitable, and as best tending to induce care
and viligance on both sides, in the navigation." 58 U.S. at 177-78.
Equal division of damages was a far more equitable rule than the only alternative-the common law rule that contributory negligence barred any recovery.
Furthermore, the divided damages rule allowed the courts to avoid the particular
problem involved in proving relative fault in a collision: the only available witnesses were often the crew members of the colliding vessels, whose testimony was
influenced more by loyalty to their ship and master than by a desire to establish
the facts. For example, the conflicting testimony in The Juniata,which involved
a collision between a mail steamer and a tug, prompted the Court to say: "There
is no single fact alleged by either party injuriously affecting the other in relation
to which the antagonisms in the evidence are not as direct and absolute as is
possible .... Even the place of the collision-whether on the east or west side

of the river-is wrapped in the darkness arising from this conflict." 93 U.S. 337,
338-39 (1876).
9. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873).
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collision, and, furthermore, that it could not have been a cause., '
Under this rule a technical statutory violation with only a tenuous
causal connection to the collision renders the violator liable for
one-half of the damages. Subsequent to The Pennsylvania, the
divided damages rule was further expanded to govern certain noncollision property damage situations-to collisions between ships
and fixed objects,'" and ship groundings.1 2 While the inflexibility
of the divided damages rule sometimes produced an inequitable
result as between the parties at fault, 13 it was used with the traditional flexibility of admiralty as a basis for the right of contribution
when an innocent third party sued one of the parties at fault for
collision or grounding damages. First, the parties at fault were held
jointly and severally liable for damages to an innocent third
party," so that the innocent party could sue either one of the
parties at fault and collect the full amount of his damages. Subsequently a defendant, sued by an innocent cargo owner, was permitted to implead others whose fault may have contributed to the
collision.' 5 The court reasoned that since contribution was regarded as "a substantial legal right" of parties at fault who were
before the court, it would be "a gross anomaly" to deny a court the
power to bring in one of them if absent.' Finally, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that since contribution was a substantive
10. Id. at 136.
11. Atlee v. Northwestern Union Packet Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389 (1874)
(ship struck pier); Louis-Dreyfuss v. Seaboard Great Lakes Corp., 69 F.2d 71 (2d
Cir. 1934) (ship struck bridge).
12. White Oak Transp. Co. v. Boston, Cape Cod & N.Y. Canal Co., 258 U.S.
341 (1922). This was the first American case to hold that the divided damages
rule was generally applicable to groundings. See also United States v. Standard
Oil Co, 498 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1974).
13. The instant case clearly illustrates the blind equality of the division dictated by the rule: the plaintiff, who was the only party to suffer injury, contributed seventy-five per cent to the cause of the grounding, yet according to the
divided damages rule, the defendant was required to pay one-half of the plaintiff's
damages.
14. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876) (when a collision between two tugs was
caused by their mutual fault, the cargo owner of a canal boat towed by one of
the colliding vessels could recover the full amount of its damages from either of
the tugs); The Juniata, 93 U.S. 337 (1876).
15. The Mariska, 107 F. 989 (7th Cir. 1901). See also The Hudson, 15 F. 162
(S.D.N.Y. 1883). In The Hudson, the defendant was permitted to implead a tug
that contributed to the collision. Only a few months after that case was decided,
the Supreme Court promulgated Rule 59 of Admiralty Practice, permitting impleader generally in collision cases. Admiralty R. 59, 112 U.S. 743 (1882).
16. 15 F. at 166.
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right arising directly from the tort, a defendant who paid an innocent cargo owner in full could bring a separate suit for contribution
against other parties at fault in the collision.1 7 Thus the courts
insured that no party would be forced to bear a disproportionate
amount of damages merely because of the plaintiff's selection of
defendants. Nevertheless, a party at fault remained liable for a
fixed percentage of the damages," regardless of his relative degree
of fault. 9 In order to soften the harshness of this rule, the courts
17. Erie R.R. v. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 204 U.S. 220 (1907). This principle
was reiterated in Drummond v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Va. 1948).
The attitude of admiralty courts toward contribution has thus been very different
from the attitude of common law courts. The general rule at common law prohibited contribution between joint tortfeasors. W. PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTs § 50.
When contribution was allowed it was not a "substantive legal right" but an
equitable remedy chosen at the discretion of the court. Reath, Contribution between PersonsJointly Chargedfor Negligence, 12 HARv. L. REV. 176, 184 (1899).
18. The mechanics of the divided damages rule were set forth in The
Sapphire, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 51 (1873); the Court also described the rule in The
North Star, 106 U.S. 17, 22 (1882), as follows: "[I]n cases of collision occuring
by the fault of both parties, the entire damage to both ships is added together in
one common mass and equally divided between them, and thereupon arises a
liability of one part to pay to the other such sum as is necessary to equalize the
burden." If the collision is the proximate cause of damage to other property, the
amount of that damage will be included in the "common mass." A shipper's right
to recover in full for damage to cargo has particularly been upheld by the courts.
Although both the Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. § 192 (1970), and The Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(a) (1970) [hereinafter cited as COGSA],
purport to exempt a carrier from any liability to the shipper of its own cargo based
on negligence of the master or crew in navigation or management of the ship, the
divided damages computation effectively nullifies this exemption. Thus a shipper
whose cargo was damaged in a collision between its carrier and another vessel may
recover in full from the non-carrying vessel; however, when damages are then
divided between the two ships, the common mass that is divided includes the
cargo damage paid by the non-carrier, and the carrier's statutory exemption is,
thereby, nullified. The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
Shipowners formerly used the "both to blame" clause in bills of lading to avoid
this result; the clause required the shipper to reimburse the carrier for payments
it makes to the non-carrier in order to divide the damages to shipper's cargo. The
clause was invalidated, however, in United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 343
U.S. 236 (1952). See H. BAER, ADmiRALTY LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT 222 (2d ed.
1969).
19. Ultimately a single liability arises from the application of the divided
damages rule: the liability of one party at fault to pay an equalizing amount to
the other party. Thus, a limitation of liability statute is applied only to that
amount and only to the party who must pay it. The North Star, supra note 18.
Maritime insurance contracts, on the other hand, will often provide that a mutual
fault collision creates cross-liabilities, i.e., no common mass is calculated, but
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attempted to contract its scope in the same manner once used to
expand it 2"-by changing the evidentiary rules that governed the
finding of mutual fault. The "major-minor" rule, in the form
adopted by the Supreme Court,21' permits a court to resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of a party whose fault was relatively
insignificant so long as the fault of the other party would alone
have been sufficient to cause the collision. " After the application
of the major-minor rule the evidence may support a finding that
the minor fault was not a cause of the collision 3 and thereby relieve
that party of all liability for damages. When the facts of a collision
case do not warrant the use of this device, the courts have applied
the divided damages rule, while roundly criticizing its inflexibility.5 ' International criticism of the rule led to its abrogation in the
Brussels Collision Liability Convention of 1910.2 This Convention
each ship is liable for one-half of the other ship's damages. The pecuniary advantage of cross-liabilities to the insurance underwriter is illustrated in ARNOLD, 9
BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS: MARINE INSURANCE

§ 779 (1961).

20. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
21. The City of New York, 147 U.S. 72, 85 (1893).
22. When the minor fault is a statutory violation, the rule of The
Pennsylvania prevents the application of the major-minor rule. See Yang-Tsze
Ins. Ass'n v. Fumess, Withy & Co., 215 F. 859 (2d Cir. 1914) (collision damages
were divided when the negligence of one ship was found to be "inexcusable and
even unparalleled" and the other ship's minor change of course was in violation
of a statute); Hygrade v. The Gatco New Jersey, 250 F.2d 485, 487 (3d Cir. 1957)
(dictum).
23. A review of the cases in which the major-minor rule was applied revealed
that courts interpret this rule in the following different ways: (1) when one ship
is grossly at fault, all doubts are resolved in favor of the other ship; (2) the fault
of the less negligent ship is found not to be contributory; (3) a slight fault is wholly
disregarded. J. GRIFIN,

THE

AMRICAN

LAW OF COLLISION

§ 224 (1949).

24. Judge Learned Hand referred to "our obstinate cleaving to the ancient
rule which has been abrogated by nearly all civilized nations." National Bulk
Carriers v. United States, 183 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1950) (dissenting opinion).
See also Hygrade v. The Gatco New Jersey, 250 F.2d 485, 488 (3d Cir. 1957) ("the
archaic and frequently unjust rule of division of damages"); Oriental Trading &
Transp. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 173 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1949) ("w]e have no
power to divest ourselves of this vestigial relic"). On rare occasions district courts
have apportioned damages according to fault. E.g., McKeel v. Schroeder, 215 F.
Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1963). Legal commentary criticizing the rule includes G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMRALTY 531 (2d ed. 1975); Donovan, Mutual
Fault-HalfDamageRule: A CriticalAnalysis, 41 INs. COUN. J. 395 (1974); Jackson, The Archaic Rule of Dividing Damages in Maritime Collisions, 19 ALA. L.
REV. 263 (1967); Staring, supra note 4. Most writers who discuss the subject of
divided damages in any detail make some negative comment on it.
25. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules to Govern
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apportions property damage in collision cases according to relative
fault;"0 in addition, it eliminates joint and several liability, " and
thus prevents a cargo owner from recovering the full amount of his
collision loss from any one of the parties at fault. The United
States Senate never ratified this Convention, apparently because
of American cargo owners' objections to the proposed abolition of
joint and several liability, rather than because of any criticism of
the comparative fault rule.H2 Until the instant case the United
States was the only major maritime nation that had not adhered
to the Convention " or in some way replaced the equal division of
damages in collision cases with a comparative fault rule.
In the instant case the Court reconsidered the divided damages
rule in light of the policies that the rule was intended to serve. The
Court noted that the rule was no longer applied by other nations
and was followed "only grudgingly"3 by the lower federal courts.
Althought it acknowledged that the rule produced fair results both
when the parties were equally to blame and when fault could not
be accurately apportioned, the Court found the rule inequitable in
every other case. The Court was unpersuaded by the claim that the
rigid predictability of the rule encourages out-of-court settlements,
and added that, even if the claim were true, the courts could not
enforce such a harsh and inequitable rule merely to relieve their
crowded dockets. To counter the argument that this precedent
should be overturned only by Congress, the Court asserted its traditionally broad power to create legal rights and remedies in admithe Liability of Vessels when Collisions Occur between Them, Sept. 23, 1910,
reprinted in J. GRIFFIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF COLUSION 852 (1949).

26. Article 4 provides: "If two or more vessels are in fault, the liability of each
vessel shall be in proportion to the degree of the faults respectively committed.
Provided that if, having regard to the circumstances, it is not possible to establish
the degree of the respective faults, or if it appears that the faults are equal, the
liability shall be apportioned equally."
27. Article 4 further provides: "The damages caused either to the vessels, or
to their cargoes, or to the effects or other property of the crews, passengers, or
other persons on board, shall be borne by the vessels in fault in the above propor-

tions without joint and several liability toward third persons."
28. The Court in the instant case accepted this interpretation of the Senate's
failure to ratify the Convention. Consequently, the Court rejected the contention
that the Senate's inaction manifested Congressional disapproval of comparative
fault. 95 S.Ct. at 1714 n.14.
29. Thirty-eight nations, including all major seagoing countries except the
United States now adhere to the Convention. 95 S.Ct. at 1712 n.7.
30. 95 S.Ct. at 1712.
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ralty.31 It noted further that the adoption of a proportional fault
rule in this case would cause the law of property damage liability
to conform to the statutes3 enacted by Congress to govern liability
for maritime personal injury. Since this left "sheer inertia" as the
only justification for the divided damages rule, the Court concluded that a rule based on comparative fault should be applied
to determine liability for property damage resulting from a collision or grounding, restricting the equal division of damages to
cases in which the fault either is equally divided or is not reasonably allocable.
The Court's decision in the instant case to overturn centuries of
precedent will no doubt be universally applauded. The same considerations of justice and equity that once favored the divided
damages rule over common law contributory negligence now lead
the Court to adopt the comparative fault rule and to harmonize
United States law in this area with the law of most other seafaring
nations. The Court did not, however, show any inclination to adopt
other rules in the Brussels Convention that conflict with present
American law. For example, the Court chose not to abolish the
joint and several liability of parties at fault for property damage
resulting from a collision.3 3 Policy and precedent present forceful
arguments for retention of joint and several liability notwithstanding the Convention. This principle protects the right of innocent
third parties, most notably the owner of cargo damaged or lost in
a collision, to collect in full for their losses.34 Protection of the cargo
owner against overreaching by the carrier has been a matter of
Congressional concern, as expressed in the specific provisions and
the general policies of the Harter Act and the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act.35 Elimination of the divided damages rule will proba31. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970), the Court discussed its "traditional responsibility to vindicate the policies of maritime laws":
if there is no reason for existing distinctions and anomalies, then the court should
not presume that Congress intended to freeze them into maritime law in the
absence of compelling evidence. 398 U.S. at 396.
32. Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1975); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 766 (1975).
33. See note 27 supra.
34. Donovan, Mutual Fault-HalfDamage Rule: A CriticalAnalysis, 41 INs.
COUN. J. 395 (1974), presents the arguments in favor of joint and several liability.
35. COGSA, supra note 18, sets out in section 3 the broad grounds on which
a cargo owner may recover; the grounds on which a carrier may avoid liability
are defined in section 4 as exceptions to the general rule. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
THE LAW OF ADMMALTY §§ 3-28 (2d ed. 1975). See also United States v. Atlantic
Mut. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236 (1952).
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bly affect the rules that govern the findings of fault and causation
in collision cases. Since the major-minor rule has traditionally
been applied to counter the inequity of the divided damages rule,
little use for it remains now that the inequity has been abolished.
When there is great disparity between the contributing faults of
the parties, the apportionment of damages will now reflect that
disparity. Thus, the application of the major-minor rule would
only permit the party less at fault to escape liability for its just
portion of damages. Application of the rule of The Pennsylvania
will now have a less inequitable effect on the relative liabilities
arising from mutual fault. A party who violates a statute often
cannot satisfy the heavy burden imposed by the rule to show that
the violation could not have been a contributing cause of the collision. Nonetheless, if he can show that the violation probably did
not cause the collision, then his fault should be considered a comparatively slight cause, and thus the share of damages apportioned
to him will be correspondingly slight. If the Court, however, were
to examine these rules in relation to their policy bases, as it examined the divided damages rule in the instant case, it would find
ample support for their abandonment.
Anne Markey

ADMIRALTY-WRONGFUL DEATH-GENERAL MARITIME LAW PROVIDES REMEDY FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING OF DECEDENT INCURRED IN
WRONGFUL DEATH ON HIGH SEAS BUT NOT FOR FUNERAL EXPENSES

Plaintiff, administrator of the estate of a decedent suffering
wrongful death on the high seas,' brought an action in federal
district court under general maritime law and, in the alternative,
under a Massachusetts survival statute2 for the conscious pain and
suffering3 incurred by the decedent prior to death and for the funeral expenses incurred by the decedent's estate.4 The defendant
contended that recovery of damages for the decedent's pain and
suffering and for funeral expenses was prohibited by a federal statute restricting damages to "pecuniary loss." ' The district court
found, however, that the defendant had negligently caused the
death of the decedent and awarded the plaintiff damages both for
conscious pain and suffering and for funeral expenses. On appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, held,
damages for pain and suffering allowed and funeral expenses denied. General maritime law provides a remedy for the pain and
suffering of a person incurred in wrongful death on the high seas,
1. Decedent, Janet Barbe, was a passenger on a 26-foot Owens Sea Skiff that
the defendant, David N. Drummond, had purchased only the day before Drummond and Barbe embarked on a nocturnal journey across the Massachusetts Bay.
Because of Drummond's inexperience with power boats, and his failure to acquaint himself with the craft's safety equipment, Drummond was unable to restart his vessel when it stalled on the high seas. Since sinking seemed imminent,
Drummond constructed a makeshift raft on which he launched Miss Barbe. She
died from exposure shortly thereafter; Drummond, however, was rescued the next
morning.
2. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 228, § 1(2)(a) (1974). This statute reads in pertinent
part: "In addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the following
shall survive . . .(2) [a]ctions of tort (a) for assault, battery, imprisonment or
other damages to the person . . . ." This statute, when applicable, permits a

cause of action for pain and suffering to survive the death of the victim. Gaudette
v. Webb,

__

Mass.

, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972).

3. The court of appeals does not mention whether the plaintiff sought recovery
for the wrongful death of the decedent, Janet Barbe, in addition to damages for
her pain and suffering prior to death. In any event, no damages for wrongful death
were awarded in either court.
4. Under Massachusetts law the estate of the decedent is primarily liable for
the decedent's funeral expenses. See Magrath v. Sheehan, 296 Mass. 263, 5
N.E.2d 547 (1936).
5. Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
DOHSA]. Section 762 provides: "The recovery in such suit shall be a fair and
just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose
benefit the suit is brought. . .

."

(Emphasis added.)
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but an award of funeral expenses is prohibited by federal statute.
Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974).
8
Prior to 1886, when the Supreme Court decided The Harrisburg,
the courts were in disagreement over whether actions for wrongful
death could be maintained under general maritime law.' The Supreme Court resolved this controversy in The Harrisburgby holding that federal maritime law did not provide a remedy for wrongful death.' Nevertheless, The Harrisburgdid not preclude wrongful
death actions brought pursuant to the wrongful death statute of
the state in whose territorial waters the accident occurred.' In 1920
Congress supplemented the state remedies for wrongful death
when it enacted the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) 0 and
6.

119 U.S. 199 (1886).

7. A majority of the reported decisions permitted an action for wrongful death
under general maritime law. George & Moore, Wrongful Death and Survival
Actions under the General Maritime Law: Pre-HarrisburgThrough PostMoragne, 4 J. MARI. L. & CoMm. 1 (1972-1973) [hereinafter cited as George &
Moore]. Actions for pain and suffering appear to have met with general disfavor
from the early admiralty courts. The courts adopted the common-law rule that
the right of action for personal injury abates upon the death of the injured party.
See, e.g., Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas. 386 (No. 6,625) (D. Md.
1879). See generally George & Moore at 8. The origin of the common law rule is
unclear. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 126 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER]. It appears that the rule has its basis in the same feudal principles
cited in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), as the basis
for denying an action for wrongful death. See PROSSER § 126; note 8 infra. Thus
as a practical matter, the Court's decision in The Harrisburg,although strictly
precluding only the general maritime remedy for wrongful death, effectively precluded a general maritime remedy for pain and suffering prior to death as well.
See George & Moore at 13.
8. The Court in The Harrisburgrelied on English precedent in its refusal to
recognize a wrongful death action in general maritime law. 119 U.S. at 204 (1886).
The English courts in turn based their refusal primarily on the felony-merger
doctrine-a principle of law prevailing in England during feudal times but never
adopted in the United States. Thus The Harrisburgrested on shaky ground, even
at the time it was rendered.
9. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
10. 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq. (1970). DOHSA gives a remedy for the death of a
person when caused by "wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high
seas." A "wrongful act, neglect, or default" includes both actions for unseaworthiness and negligence when brought on behalf of a seaman. See McLaughlin v.
Bildberg Rothchild Co., 167 F. Supp. 714. However, since it is well settled that
a shipowner owes no duty of seaworthiness to a non-seaman (other than to certain
types of harborworkers), recovery under DOHSA on behalf of a non-seaman is
restricted to an action based on negligence. See In re Dearborn Marine Service,
Inc., 499 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1974). Coverage of DOHSA is not limited to any
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the Jones Act. 1 Although the Jones Act provides for the survival
of an action for the pain and suffering of a decedent killed as a
result of his employer's negligence, the Act is restricted to seamen.12 DOHSA, on the other hand, is not limited to any particular
class of persons; however, it does not provide for the survival of
actions.' 3 While this omission could be interpreted as deliberate,' 4
particular class of decedents. The recovery is, however, for the "exclusive benefit
of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative." 46 U.S.C.
§ 761 (1970). Recovery is also limited to compensation for the "pecuniary loss
sustained." 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1970). See note 5 supra.
11. 46 U.S.C. § 688 et seq. (1970). The Jones Act incorporates the provisions
of the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1970) (F.E.L.A.),
thereby providing for the survival of actions. See 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1970). The Jones
Act, like DOHSA, is for the exclusive benefit of certain beneficiaries; however,
unlike DOHSA, the Jones Act sets up a system of ordered classes of beneficiaries. A member of a lower class may recover only if there are no members of a
higher class living. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
The class of highest priority is comprised of the spouse and children of the decedent. The next highest class consists of the parents of the decedent. The final
class is made up of the decedent's next of kin that were dependent upon him prior
to his death.
12. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970); Cleveland Tankers, Inc. v. Tierney, 169 F.2d 622
(6th Cir. 1948). See generally G. GILMoRE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY
§ 6-30 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GiLMORE & BLACK].
13. Canillas v. Joseph H. Carter, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Section 765 of DOHSA has language resembling that of a survival statute. However,
it has been held to revive only those actions brought by the decedent before his
death for injuries sustained from the wrongful act. "Had Congress intended to
create a cause of action for conscious suffering which would survive to the representatives of the decedent or the group of beneficiaries denominated in section
761 [of U.S.C. title 46], it indicated in the Jones Act that it was well aware of
language apt to produce this result. Absent such language in the Death on the
High Seas Act, no cause of action for conscious suffering is created thereby."
Brown v. Anderson-Nichols & Co., 203 F. Supp. 489 (D. Mass. 1962).
Moreover, section 765 has been held to apply only to those actions for the
recovery of "compensation provided in section 762," i.e., pecuniary loss, and not
for the recovery of pain and suffering. Petition of Gulf Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp.
911, 916 n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). On the other hand, it has been suggested that a
literal interpretation of section 765 may not be in order and that the section may
indeed revive actions for pain and suffering brought by the decedent prior to
death. Abbott v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
14. "The High Seas Act and the Jones Act, incorporating FELA, were passed
almost at the same time; it is a reasonable assumption that the failure of Congress
to provide specifically in the High Seas Act for the double recovery must have
been deliberate and that only pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries was meant to be
recoverable. On the other hand, no reason of policy suggests itself to explain why
the two acts should have adopted different measures of recovery." GmmoRE &
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the courts have generally refused to construe DOHSA so strictly.'5
The passage of DOHSA in 1920 provided a federal remedy for
wrongful death on the high seas where none had existed before, but
since it did not provide exhaustive coverage of all maritime torts,
it did little to ease the conflict between state and federal law that
inevitably arises when both systems legislate on the same subject
matter." The difficulties in reconciling the conflicts between the
two bodies of law were heightened by The Tungus v. Skovgaard'7
and Lindgren v. United States.'8 The Tungus restricted the ability
of the admiralty courts to work around the constraint imposed by
The Harrisburg. The Supreme Court held in The Tungus that
whenever a gap in the federal law arises that is suitably filled by
applying state law, a court is not at liberty to apply only so much

of the state law as it should see fit. Rather, an admiralty court
§ 6-33, at 308 (1st ed. 1957).
15. In Moragne v. States MarineLines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), the Supreme
Court was confronted with the argument that Congress, by legislating on the
subject of recovery in wrongful death actions in DOHSA, had preempted the field,
so that the Court was barred from creating a general maritime remedy for an
injury not expressly covered by DOHSA. The Court responded by stating that "no
intention appears that [DOHSA] have the effect of foreclosing any nonstatutory
federal remedies that might be found appropriate to effectuate the policies of
general maritime law." 398 U.S. at 400. The Court then proceeded to "conclude
that the Death on the High Seas Act was not intended to preclude the availability
of a remedy for wrongful death under general maritime law in situations not
covered by the Act." 398 U.S. at 402. Since DOHSA does not cover the survival
of actions, the courts are generally agreed that DOHSA does not preclude recovery for damages brought under a state survival statute, even if the wrongful act
occurred on the high seas. See Canillas v. Joseph H. Carter, Inc., 280 F. Supp.
48 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Abbott v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
Note, however, that the Barbe case itself may now preclude actions brought under
state survival statutes, although DOHSA alone would not. See note 16 infra.
16. In Romero v. InternationalTerminal OperatingCo., 358 U.S. 354 (1959),
the Supreme Court discussed the problems presented by state and federal legislation in the same subject area. The Court stressed that matters maritime were not
properly the exclusive province of federal legislation, but that admiralty law was
the outgrowth of a "highly intricate interplay of the States and the National
Government in their regulation of maritime commerce." 358 U.S. at 373. Federal
admiralty law supersedes the state law only when the courts find "inroads on a
harmonious system," but "this limitation still leaves the States a wide scope."
358 U.S. at 373. Thus a state may regulate maritime affairs, so long as its law
does not contravene any act of Congress or otherwise interfere with the harmony
of federal law. See also Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 389 (1941).
17. 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
18. 281 U.S. 38 (1930). The Lindgren doctrine was later reaffirmed in Gillespie
v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
BLACK
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must apply a state right "with whatever conditions and limitations
the creating State has attached." 9 Whereas The Tungus staked
out an exclusive domain for state law in which the admiralty courts
were not to tread, the Lindgren decisibn set forth a similar exclusive domain for federal law. In Lindgren the Supreme Court found
that the Jones Act superseded any recovery available to seamen for
wrongful death under state law.2" Hence, the Court refused to allow
recovery for the wrongful death of a seaman under a state cause of
action for unseaworthiness, even though the wrongful act occurred
in state waters.2 The difficulties encountered in working with state
law to fill the gaps in federal maritime law finally prompted the
Supreme Court to overrule The Harrisburgin Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc.22 In Moragne a longshoreman was killed while
working aboard a vessel within the territorial waters of Florida. His
personal representative brought actions for wrongful death and for
pain and suffering, both of which were denied, since the Florida
statutory right of action for wrongful death did not include unseaworthiness as a basis of liability. After granting certiorari, the
19. 358 U.S. at 592.
20. The Court in Lindgren expressly reserved the question whether the Jones
Act superseded DOHSA. The lower courts have since consistently held that the
Jones Act does not preclude recovery by the personal representative of a seaman
under DOHSA. See, e.g., The Four Sisters, 75 F. Supp. 399 (D. Mass. 1947).
21. Lindgren spawned one of three anomalies stemming from The Harrisburg,
as determined by the Court in Moragne. A true seaman covered by the Jones Act
had, as a result of Lindgren, no remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness
within territorial waters, since the Jones Act allows recovery only upon proof of
negligence. A harborworker, on the other hand, did have a remedy for unseaworthiness when allowed by state statute. Although the remedy of unseaworthiness
was extended to harborworkers simply because they performed the duties of seamen, since they were not covered by the Jones Act, the Lindgren preclusion did
not apply to them. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 396
(1970). If, however, the same seaman did not die but was merely injured, a
wrongful death was not involved and Lindgren would not preclude the joinder of
an action under the Jones Act for negligence and an action under state maritime
law for unseaworthiness. This exemplified the second of the anomalies, i.e., that
a shipowner may have been liable for personal injuries to a worker within territorial waters but often not for death. Although Lindgren was not the sole source
of this anomaly, since the failure of a state to provide recovery for a wrongful
death to a non-seaman generally had the same effect, Lindgren did contribute its
share of anomalous results. Finally, it was anomalous that a federal remedy
existed for the death of a person caused by wrongful act occurring more than
three miles from shore, but no such federal remedy existed for death by the same
act occurring within this boundary. See generally M. NORMS, THE LAw OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 135 (2d ed. 1966); GEORGE & MOORE at 8.
22. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit and created a general maritime remedy for wrong-

ful death." The Court based its decision primarily on the widespread acceptance of wrongful death actions by statutory enactment in every state and on the concomitant rejection of the old
decisional rule on which The Harrisburgwas basedY4 Because the
Court in Moragne was overturning nearly a century of precedent,
it wisely left the details of such a dramatic reversal to be resolved
in the lower courts.n After Moragne, the Court in Sea-Land Serv23. Although the plaintiff's suit included causes of action for both wrongful
death and for pain and suffering, the Supreme Court ruled only on the action for
wrongful death. The Court left "particular questions of the measure of damages"
for resolution in the lower courts using both DOHSA and the numerous state
wrongful death statutes for guidance. Presumably, decision on the action for pain
and suffering was reserved for later consideration under the label of "measure of
damages."
24. "We need not, however, pronounce a verdict on whether The Harrisburg,
when decided, was a correct extrapolation of the principles of decisional law then
in existence. A development of major significance has intervened, making clear
that the rule against recovery for wrongful death is sharply out of keeping with
the policies of modem American maritime law. This development is the wholesale
abandonment of the rule in most cases where it once held sway, quite evidently
prompted by the same sense of the rule's injustice that generated so much criticism of its original promulgation." 398 U.S. at 388. In overruling The Harrisburg
the Supreme Court emphasized the anomalous result of the rule denying recovery
as well as the states' widespread statutory rejection of it. See note 21 supra.
25. Subsequent to Moragne, there has naturally been disagreement among the
circuits over where the courts should look for guidance to fill out the details in
the new general maritime remedy created by Moragne. See Annot., 18 A.L.R.
Fed. 184 (1974). Some courts have chosen to look to DOHSA and other federal
statutes as the only proper source to determine the measure of damages for the
Moragne remedy. See, e.g., Strickland v. Nutt, 264 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 1972).
Proponents of this position cite Moragne statements that admiralty law should
operate uniformly in the whole country as support for their approach. The opposing point of view notes that Moragne expressly suggested that the lower courts
refer to both federal and state statutes to fill in the lacunae for the new federal
cause of action. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 408
(1970). Thus, argue the proponents of this view, the search for a single source of
law to establish a uniform measure of damages throughout the circuits is improper. See, e.g., Dennis v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp., 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1972).
The prevailing point of view justifiably seems to be the latter. Annot., 18 A.L.R.
Fed. 184 (1974). It seems the better interpretation not only of Supreme Court
pronouncements in Moragne but also of the doctrine of uniformity. As a constitutional doctrine, uniformity refers only to the preemptive power of a federal remedy when it conflicts with a state remedy. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205 (1917); Greene v. Vantage Steamship Corp., 466 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1972).
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ices, Inc. v. Gaudet26 attempted to resolve some of the controversy
among the circuits over the proper measure of damages for the
Moragne wrongful death action. In Sea-Land the personal repre-

sentative of the decedent2" brought an action for wrongful death
from injuries incurred in territorial waters, and sought damages for
loss of support, services, and society, and for funeral expenses.
Although the decedent had previously recovered damages for injuries sustained in the accident,29 the Court found that none of the
causes of action in the second suit had been litigated, so that the
doctrine of res judicata did not apply. The Court then granted all
elements of recovery sought by the plaintiff except insofar as the
damages recovered in the first action overlapped those in the second.29 However, since the decedent in Sea-Land recovered for injuAs a matter of policy, uniformity among the circuits is, of course, desirable;

however, it is not mandated any more than one circuit is mandated to follow
another circuit's interpretation of a federal statute. Thus it is incorrect to assert
that a 1920 federal statute must be applied by analogy in order to insure that all
circuits develop a uniform and proper interpretation of the measure of damages
for a Moragne wrongful death action.
Note, however, that there has been a tendency among the courts to look primarily to DOHSA and the Jones Act to determine the proper beneficiaries of the
Moragne wrongful death remedy. See The Cambria Steamship, 505 F.2d 517 (6th
Cir. 1974); Mungin v. Calmar Steamship Corp., 342 F. Supp. 479 (D. Md. 1972).
This might be explained by the Congressional consistency in limiting recovery to
virtually the same classes of beneficiaries in both the Jones Act and DOHSA. The
same consistency does not exist for the measure of damages. As a practical matter
the courts may feel that some limit must be placed on potential plaintiffs to avoid
unnecessary litigation.
26. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
27. The decedent, a longshoreman, died as a result of injuries received on the
defendant's vessel while in Louisiana territorial waters.
28. The decedent recovered damages for past and future wages, pain and
suffering, and medical expenses.
29. There are seven elements of damages for wrongful death that may be
recovered by survivors either under statute or at common law as in Sea-Land.
They are as follows: (1) loss of support and contribution, (2) lost inheritance, (3)
loss of services, (4) loss of society, (5) mental anguish, (6) medical expenses, and
(7) funeral expenses. See generally S.

SPEISER,

RECOVERY FOR

WRONGFUL

DEATH

(1966) [hereinafter cited as SPEISER]. Sea-Land represents authority for the recovery of most of these elements in a Moragne action for wrongful death caused
by injuries sustained in territorial waters.
The Court did not award recovery for lost inheritance, presumably because it
was not requested. Although loss of support and contribution is probably the core
of a survivor's recovery for the wrongful death of a benefactor, the present value
of lost inheritance has been held to be a damage separate and apart from loss of
support and thus recoverable under DOHSA. National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268
F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959).
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ries personal to him prior to his death, the Court did not indicate
whether general maritime law would allow the survival of such an
action had he died before initiating the first suit."
The court in Barbe v. Drummond noted that under DOHSA
recovery for wrongful death on the high seas was limited to compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained.3 Since pecuniary loss
The Court did not award damages for the mental anguish of the survivors,
commonly referred to as survivors' grief. Recovery of this element of damages has
met with much greater resistance in the courts than have most of the other
elements. The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
awarded survivors' grief noting a "marked tendency in the common-law states to
expand the concept of damages recoverable for wrongful death to embrace some
measure of compensation for the emotional suffering of survivors." In re Sincere
Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652, 655 (E.D. La. 1971). But the Louisiana court
is distinctly in the minority. See Petition of M/V Elaine Jones, 480 F.2d 11 (5th
Cir. 1973); Greene v. Vantage Steamship Corp., 466 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1972). See
also SPEISER § 3:45 (Supp. 1974).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Sea-Land did not award medical expenses
since the decedent had recovered such expenses in a previous suit, but the Court
did award funeral expenses. The Court found the award of funeral services appropriate when the decedent's dependents have either paid for the funeral or are
liable for its payment. In this award the Court followed the clear consensus of the
states. See, e.g., Dennis v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp., 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1972).
Finally the Court in Sea-Land awarded damages for loss of the decedent's
society and services. Recovery for loss of the decedent's services has become
standard in most jurisdictions and is crucial in recovering for the death of a
decedent, such as a mother, whose services were most valuable to the beneficiaries
even though they may be difficult to value monetarily. See Smith, Wrongful
Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C. L. REv. 402, 418 (1966). Recovery for
the loss of the decedent's society is a much more controversial element of damages. Prior to Sea-Land, the federal courts generally denied recovery for loss of
society. See, e.g., Simpson v. Knutsen, 444 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1971). Nonetheless,
allowance of damages for loss of society follows "the recent trend [that] is unmistakeably in favor of permitting such recovery." SPEISER § 3:42, at 218.
30. Damages personal to the decedent, such as pain and suffering incurred
prior to death, are normally recoverable only by provision for survival of the
action and not under a wrongful death action, although imprecise legislative
drafting has blurred this distinction in many jurisdictions. See SPEISER § 14:1.
Since DOHSA does not provide for the survival of personal rights of action,
recovery for pain and suffering of non-seamen wrongfully killed on the high seas
must be provided either under a state survival statute or under a general maritime provision for the survival of remedies. See Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp.,
300 F. Supp. 1167 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Petition of Gulf Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). See also notes 13 and 15 supra.
31. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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had been held to exclude pain and suffering, 2 the court determined
that recovery for pain and suffering could be allowed only under
an action independent of DOHSA. The court considered three
theories advanced by the plaintiff as bases for recovering pain and
suffering. The first looked to state law for a survival statute to
supplement general maritime law. The second relied on Moragne
as direct authority for the existence of a general maritime law
survival action. The third theory asserted that although Moragne
may not be applicable as direct authority since the injury in
Moragne occurred outside the scope of DOHSA, the same policy
grounds requiring the creation of a general maritime remedy for
wrongful death in Moragne urged the creation of a general maritime survival action.n After discussing the difficulties inherent in
the first two theories, the court adopted the third. It reasoned that
the third theory avoided the difficulties of incorporating state law
into admiralty34 as well as the difficulties of conflict with
DOHSA.35 When confronted with the issue of funeral expenses, the
court found that DOHSA presented a more formidable barrier.
Despite the Supreme Court's approval of the award 'of funeral
expenses for an injury in territorial waters,36 the court found that
32. Dennis v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp., 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972);
Canillas v. Joseph H. Carter, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
33. For a discussion of the policy grounds behind the Moragne decision see
notes 24 and 21 supra and accompanying text.
34. In looking to state law for a survival statute to supplement federal maritime law, the court found two principal difficulties. First, it must be determined
whether the state survival statute was intended to apply to actions arising from
injury incurred on the high seas. The determination is a difficult one since apparently few state legislatures contemplated such an application when drafting their
survival statutes. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 393
n.10 (1970). The second difficulty in using state law to supplement federal maritime law is the probability of inconsistency in relief accorded by a federal court
over essentially federal subject matter. Although this non-uniformity in federal
law is generally not prohibited by the constitutional doctrine of uniformity since
state law produces the non-uniformity and federal law is "silent," as a matter of
policy, consistent treatment in federal courts is desirable. For a brief discussion
of the doctrine of uniformity see note 25 supra.
35. The second theory, in relying on Moragne as direct authority for the creation of a federal maritime survival action, encountered difficulties arising from
differences between the applicable law in the two areas. Moragne established
federal maritime law in an area in which Congress had not legislated. However,
since the injury in Barbe arose on the high seas, the case was directly governed
by DOHSA. To avoid these complications, the court simply used the Moragne
policy basis as support for the creation of new federal law not covered by DOHSA
and labelled this "theory three."
36. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 591 (1974).
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funeral expenses did not present a pecuniary loss recoverable
under DOHSA. Moreover, since the court determined that funeral
expenses were properly recoverable only in an action for wrongful
death, the recovery of funeral expenses could not be supported by
a separate cause outside the domain of DOHSA, as was the case

with recovery of pain and suffering. Thus the court held that federal maritime law provides a remedy for the pain and suffering of
a person wrongfully killed on the high seas; whereas, award of
funeral expenses is prohibited by federal statute.
In creating a general maritime survival action, the Barbe court

added still another link in the chain of general maritime law precipitated by the Supreme Court in Moragne. The Barbe addition
was the next logical step in the development of the law. 7 Although
not unexpected," the creation of a federal survival action insures
the existence of a remedy for an injury widely acknowledged as
deserving of relief." It further guards against the inconsistent allowance of relief that is inherent in relying on state law to provide
an essentially federal remedy. On the other hand, the Barbe court
refused an award of funeral expenses on the ground that funeral
expenses could not be classified as pecuniary loss and were, therefore, impermissible elements of recovery under DOHSA.1" Al37. Prior to Barbe, courts had allowed recovery under general maritime law
for pain and suffering from a wrongful injury incurred within territorial waters
and resulting in death. See Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr., and Associates, Inc.,
466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972); In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652
(E.D. La. 1971). Courts had also allowed, under state survival statutes, recovery
for pain and suffering from a fatal injury incurred on the high seas. See Petition
of Gulf Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp.911 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
38.

See GEORGE & MOORE at 13.

39. See SPEISER § 3:49.
40. Because funeral expenses are not ordinarily recoverable in survival actions, the Barbe court was unable to avoid the dictates of DOHSA by awarding
funeral expenses in the same manner that it awarded damages for pain and
suffering. Conceivably the Court could have awarded funeral expenses without
regard to DOHSA by asserting that Moragne created a wrongful death action
independent of any statutory restrictions. Under such a rationale the court would
be free to shape the recovery as it pleased, with DOHSA providing only a persuasive analogy. It has been suggested that Moragne had this very effect. See
GILMORE & BLACK § 6-32.
Nevertheless, the Barbe court refused to give such an expansive interpretation
to Moragne. It was well aware of the proper boundaries of the judiciary in creating
law-to fill lacunae and not to overrule admittedly outdated statutory law. The
court implicitly recognized that although DOHSA "was not intended to preclude
the availability of a remedy for wrongful death under general maritime law in
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though the court's reasoning is not logically faultless,4 ' the DOHSA
limitation of recovery to "pecuniary loss" would seem to imply this
result rather than the allowance sought by the plaintiff.4" However,
this interpretation of the DOHSA limitation refuses relief that
would be granted in the great majority of states.4 ' Because of the
widespread acceptance of recovery for funeral expenses in state
law, recovery under federal law in state waters is assured under the
policies enunciated in Moragne.41 Thus in addition to refusing a
remedy widely recognized under state law, the Barbe interpretation of pecuniary loss introduces a fundamental difference between
the general maritime law for territorial waters and the general
maritime law for the high seas, without discernible policy grounds
for the differentiation. Although such an inconsistency is not prohibited by the doctrine of uniformity, the policy grounds against
prohibiting recovery of funeral expenses under federal law should
override judicial hesitation to give certain statutory words a
broader interpretation than their plain meaning would seem to
imply.
James F. Maddox

situations not covered by the Act," DOHSA should be regarded as the exclusive
law in situations that are clearly covered by its provisions. See note 15 supra. To
hold otherwise would give the judiciary license to revoke legislation at will under
the guise of formulating federal common law.

41. The Barbe court reasoned that the beneficiaries of the decedent experi-

enced no pecuniary loss, since the wrongful death of the decedent merely accelerated the inevitable. Nevertheless, the acceleration itself occasions the loss of

interest that would otherwise have accrued had the decedent lived out her normal
life. See Florida E.C.R.R. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504 (1914).

42. First Nat'l Bank v. National Airlines, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y.
1958). Contra Moore v. 0/S Fram, 226 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
43. See SPEISER § 3:49.
44. The Sea-Land case specifically authorizes the recovery of funeral expenses
for wrongful death in territorial waters. 414 U.S. at 591. See note 29 supra.

ARBITRATION-SECURITIES

REGULATION-IN INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF SECURITIES, ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS BINDING NOTWITHSTANDING NON-WAIVERABILITY OF JUDICIAL REMEDY OF SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

Respondent,' an American manufacturer, contracted with peti-

tioner, 2 a German citizen, to purchase petitioner's European enterprises.' The sale involved securities4 and included certain trademarks that the defendant expressly warranted were unencumbered. The contract contained a clause providing that any controversy or claim arising out of the contract or the breach thereof

would be settled exclusively by arbitration.5 Respondent allegedly
1. Respondent, Alberto-Culver Co., is a Delaware corporation with its principal office in Illinois. Alberto, a publicly held corporation whose stock is traded
on the New York Stock Exchange, manufactures and distributes toiletries and
hair care products in national and international markets.
2. Petitioner, Fritz Scherk, resided at the time of trial in Switzerland, and,
prior to the transactions at issue, engaged in the manufacture and sale of cosmetics in western European markets.
3. Principal manufacturing operations were conducted in Berlin, Germany, at
facilities owned by Scherk through a sole proprietorship, Firma Ludwig Scherk
(FLS). Scherk also owned interrelated businesses in Liechtenstein-Scherk Etablissement Vaduz (SEV)-and Germany-Lodeva Herstellung und Vertrieb Kosmetischer Artikel GmbH (Lodeva). SEV was operated as a holding company
licensing the sale and distribution of Scherk's cosmetics on an international basis
under a variety of trademarks; Lodeva was dormant. Alberto-Culver Co. v.
Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 613 (7th Cir. 1973).
4. The purchase agreement provided that SEV was to be converted to a stock
corporation and Alberto was to acquire 100 per cent of the stock of the new
corporation. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the agreement to incorporate
SEV and transfer the assets of SEV, FLS, and Lodeva to Alberto in exchange for
cash and promissory notes involved a security within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 484 F.2d at 615. The Supreme Court did not decide
whether the acquisition of Scherk's enterprises was a securities transaction within
the meaning of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5,
since petitioner did not assign the adverse rulings of the court of appeals or
district court as error and the question was not briefed or argued before the
Supreme Court. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 514 n.8 (1974).
5. The purchase agreement provided as to the acquisition of SEV:
The parties agree that if any controversy or claim shall arise out of this
agreement or the breach thereof and either party shall request that the
matter shall be settled by arbitration, the matter shall be settled exclusively by arbitration in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the
International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France, by a single arbitrator,
if the parties shall agree upon one, or by one arbitrator appointed by each
party and a third arbitrator appointed by the other arbitrators. .

.

. All

arbitration proceedings shall be held in Paris, France, and each party agrees
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discovered, one year after the closing, that the trademark rights
were subject to substantial encumbrances and thereupon offered
to rescind the contract. Upon petitioner's refusal, respondent
brought suit for damages and recission, alleging that petitioner,
within the United States, made fraudulent representations and
omissions in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5.7 Petitioner filed a motion to stay the action
pending arbitration.' Respondent sought a preliminary injunction
restraining the prosecution of arbitration proceedings. The District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied petitioner's motion and granted a preliminary order enjoining petitioner from
proceeding with arbitration,9 holding that an agreement to arbitrate could not preclude a buyer of a security from seeking the
judicial remedy created and made non-waiverable by the Securities Exchange Act."0 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
to comply in all respects with any award made in any such proceeding and
to the entry of a judgment in any jurisdiction upon any award rendered in
such proceeding. The law of the State of Illinois, U.S.A. shall apply to and
govern this agreement, its interpretation and performance. 484 F.2d at 613.
Substantially similar clauses applied to the acquisition of FLS and Lodeva.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) [tlo use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
7. This rule implements § 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) [t]o employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [tlo make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1974). See generally 3 L. Loss, SECURrTES REGULATON 1421-74
(1961).
8. Alternatively, petitioner filed motions to dismiss, alleging want of personal
or subject matter jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. These motions were
denied.
9. The memorandum opinion of the district court is unreported.
10. The district court relied on Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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affirmed. On grant of writ of certiorari,"2 the Supreme Court,
held, reversed and remanded. In an international commercial
transaction involving a sale of securities, an executory arbitration
agreement shall be enforced in accord with the Arbitration Act of
1925, notwithstanding the non-waiverability of the right to sue in
federal district court under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (5-to-4 decision) .,3
The hostility of the English courts to executory arbitration
agreements was imported into this country along with the whole
of the common law. American courts followed the English precedents in holding that, since an executory 4 agreement to arbitrate
ousted the jurisdiction of the courts, the agreement would not be
specifically enforced nor would it support a stay of proceedings on
the original cause of action.15 Although there were indications that
the federal courts were becoming critical of this judicial hostility,' 6
not until Congress passed the Arbitration Act of 192517 was there
authority to require enforcement of arbitration agreements." The
11.
12.

Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court granted Scherk's petition for certiorari, 414 U.S. 1156

(1974), "[blecause of the importance of the question presented ....

."

417 U.S.

at 510.
13. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justice Douglas filed a
dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall.
14. An agreement to arbitrate made after the dispute has arisen (a nonexecutory agreement) has been given a more favorable reception by the courts.
In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), the Court did not prohibit the arbitration
of disputes involving securities if the parties decided to refer to arbitration after
the dispute arose. The Wilko decision is discussed in text accompanying notes 3741 infra.

15. For a discussion of the history of hostility towards arbitration agreements
see Judge Frank's opinion in Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading
Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942).
16. 126 F.2d at 984.
17. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
18. 9 U.S.C. § 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereunder arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or any agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.
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Act allows the costliness and delays of litigation to be avoided' 9 by
providing that agreements to arbitrate will be binding upon the
parties. 0 This command is made enforceable by providing for,
first, a stay of proceedings in an action when the court is satisfied
that the issues before it are arbitrable under the particular arbitration agreement 2' and, secondly, a court order directing parties to
proceed to arbitration when there has been a failure, neglect, or
refusal of a party to honor an arbitration agreement. 2 Recent recognition has been given to the enforceability of executory arbitration agreements in internationalcommercial contracts by the accession of the United States in 1970 to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 3 which provides that each contracting state shall recognize agreements to arbitrate differences concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration. 24 In a related area, the
The scope of application of the Federal Arbitration Act has varied since its
passage. Arbitration had been characterized as a procedural remedy. Marine
Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1931); H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1924). The Supreme Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945), held that procedural matters affecting substantive rights and significantly
influencing the outcome of litigation were actually substantive and therefore to
be governed by state law pursuant to Erie Railroad Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938). Then, in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956), the Court
held that under the outcome determinitive test of Guaranty Trust, state arbitration law was applicable in federal diversity suits. In a change of direction, the
Court, in PrimaPaint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967), declared the Federal Arbitration Act to be federal substantive law and
thus applicable in a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction. Prima Paint
avoided the emasculating effects of Bernhardt. See Coulson, Prima Paint:An
Arbitration Milestone, 22 ARn. J. 237 (1967); Comment, 46 TEx. L. REV. 260
(1967).
19. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
20. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). See note 18 supra.
21. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1970) provides:
If any suit. . . be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon
any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court. . . shall . . . stay the trial. . . until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing
the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
22. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
23. [19701 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997. Congress passed Chapter 2 of
the United States Arbitration Act to implement the Convention. 9 U.S.C. § 201
et seq. (1970).
24. Article 11(1) of the Convention provides:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under
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Supreme Court recently moved to make international dispute resolution less speculative. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co.,5
the Court rejected the rule of Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The
Monrosall that a forum selection clause in a contract will not be
enforced unless the selected state would provide a more convenient
forum than the state in which suit is brought. The Bremen decision
held that a forum selection clause in an international towage contract would be enforced by United States courts absent a strong
showing by the resisting party that enforcement would be unreasonable and would effectively deprive him of his day in court. This
new position was reached after a consideration by the Court of
"present day commercial realities and expanding international
trade."2 7 The towage contract involved the transport of costly
equipment from Louisiana to Italy. The Court saw the real possibility of much uncertainty and great inconvenience to both parties
were a suit maintainable in any of the many jurisdictions along the
route in which an accident might occur or where the tug Bremen
or its owner might be found. In honoring contractually conferred
jurisdiction the Court furthered predictability in world commerce
and brought domestic law into closer harmony with international
custom and comparative practice. 28 Together, the Bremen decision
and the Arbitration Act allow parties to international commercial
transactions to decide where and by what manner any disputes
arising in the future are to be decided. On the other hand, the
Securities Exchange Act of 193429 provides that the federal district
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences
which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined
legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration.
25. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). For an analysis of the impact of the decision see
Symposium-Comments on the Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co.: Black, The
Bremen, COGSA and the Problem of ConflictingInterpretation;Leflar, The Bremen and the Model Choice of Forum Act; Maier, The Three Faces of Zapata:
Maritime Law, Federal Common Law, Federal Courts Law, 6 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 363 (1973).
26. 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958).
27. 407 U.S. at 15.
28. For a discussion of comparative practice in Western Europe, Latin America, Scandinavia, England and the British Commonwealth, and the United States
see Proceedings of the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Foreign Law Association: The Validity of Forum Selecting Clauses, 13 AM. J. Coip. L. 157 (1964).
English courts regularly enforce contractual choice of forum clauses. See, e.g.,
The Fehmarn, [1958] 1 W.L.R. 159 (C.A.).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970).
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courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over suits brought under
the Act, 30 and that any provision binding a person to waive compliance with the Act or any rule or regulation thereunder shall be
void.3 ' The 1934 Act was enacted, inter alia, to prevent and afford
remedies for fraud in securities trading;32 and an implied civil
cause of action33 has been recognized under the § 10(b) anti-fraud
provision" and implementing Rule 10b-5. 5 Provisions of the Securities Act of 193336 grant substantially similar rights as those flowing
from the 1934 Act. The rights flowing from the 1933 Act came into
conflict with the general policy of the Arbitration Act in Wilko v.
Swan" in which a purchaser of securities sued for damages alleging
that false representations induced the sale. The vendor's defense
answered that the purchaser had agreed to submit any disputes
arising from the sale to arbitration, and, therefore, pursuant to the
Arbitration Act, the arbitration agreement should be given full
effect. The agreement to arbitrate was held to be a stipulation
binding a person to waive his right to select a judicial forum38 and
therefore violative of the non-waiver section" of the Securities Act.
The Wilko Court based its decision to allow the Securities Act
requirements to override the mandate of the Arbitration Act on
both the nature of the legal question presented in a securities fraud
dispute and the nature of the arbitration process. The question
presented in Wilko did not require an objective determination of
the quality of a commodity or the amount of money due under a
30. "The district courts of the United States... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of
all suits ... brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or
the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
31. Section 29(a), the anti-waiver provision of the Act, provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of
an exchange required thereby shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970).
32. L. Loss, SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION 130-31 (Temp. Stud. ed. 1961).
33. 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3869-73 (1969).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970). See note 7 supra.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
37. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). This case had no transnational aspects. The buyer,
Anthony Wilko, was a resident of New Rochelle, New York. He purchased the
securities in New York from Joseph E. Swan, doing business as Hayden, Stone
& Co., a domiciliary of New York, New York. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae,
Appendix (Margin Agreement), Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1970).
39. Section 14 of the 1933 Act; 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970).
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contract, questions easily resolved by commercial arbitrators, but
rather a subjective finding on the purpose behind an alleged violation of the Securities Act. The Wilko Court found that the application of these principles without judicial instruction on the law
(which a jury would receive), together with the limited reviewability of the application of legal concepts by the arbitrators" and the
limited power of the courts to vacate an award,4 1 would defeat the
intent of Congress to protect the rights of investors. The Supreme
Court was thus presented in the instant decision with two directly
conflicting policies: first, the grant of a non-waiverable right to sue
in federal court for redress of a violation of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and secondly, the enforcement command of the Arbitration Act of 1925 and the United Nations Convention along with
the choice of forum rule of the Bremen decision.
The instant Court began by recognizing the command of the
Arbitration Act and the remedies available thereunder.4 2 The
Court, accepting respondent's premise that the operative language
of the 1933 Act relied on in Wilko is contained in the 1934 Exchange Act, nevertheless found differences between the Wilko
agreement and the agreement between Alberto-Culver and Scherk
that precluded the application of the Wilko holding to the facts of
the instant case. The Wilko dispute, the Court stated, involved
parties, negotiations, and a contractual subject matter all situated
in the United States, whereas the contract in the instant case
involved negotiations in the United States, England, and Germany, a signing in Austria, and a closing in Switzerland between
an American corporation with its principal place of business and
major operations in the United States and a German citizen whose
companies were organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein.43 The instant Court determined the most significant distinction between the two cases was the instant contractual subject
matter: the sale of business enterprises whose activities were directed to European markets and which were organized under the
40. 346 U.S. at 436-37. See, e.g., Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344,
349 (1854).
41. 346 U.S. at 436 n.22. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1970).
42. See notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text.
43. While the dissent, see note 47 infra and accompanying text, discussed the
issue of whether different standards of law should apply to sophisticated buyers
as opposed to unsophisticated buyers, the majority did not reach the issue of
whether the investor safeguards of the Securities Exchange Act are not needed
by sophisticated buyers who are in a substantially equal bargaining position with
their seller, but rather decided the case on other grounds. See 417 U.S. at 512 n.6.
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laws of and primarily situated in European countries. The Court
characterized the contract as a truly international agreement that
as such involved considerations and policies significantly different
from those flowing from a domestic contract. One major consideration was the conflict of law problems that would arise were the
disputes litigated. The Court reasoned that the advantages to a
plaintiff of a wider choice of courts and venue that flow from the
Securities Exchange Act become illusory in the context of the international agreement since the opposing party might block or
hinder the plaintiff's access to the American court of his choice by
a speedy resort to a foreign court to enjoin the plaintiff from proceeding with litigation in the United States. Such a legal surprise
as this, the Court found, would imperil the willingness and ability
of businessmen to enter into international commercial agreements
and thus would damage the fabric of international commerce and
trade. The Court, viewing the agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal as a specialized type of forum selection clause that
determines the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute as
well as the situs of the suit, found in the Bremen decision additional policy arguments44 for enforcing the arbitration agreement.
Because the circumstances involved in an international commercial transaction created special problems of conflicts of law and
made the Securities Exchange Act right of suit in a federal court
illusory, the Court concluded that the agreement to arbitrate disputes arising out of the parties' international commercial transaction should be enforced by the federal courts in accordance with
the explicit provisions of the Arbitration Act.
Justice Douglas,45 with three Justices concurring, wrote a vigorous dissent to the instant decision, centered upon a strict construction of the statutes and treaty involved, and emphasizing the potential damage to shareholder equity that would flow from mismanagement by corporate officers of a transaction involving securities.4" Stating that the Exchange Act does not speak of sophisti44. See notes 25 & 27 supra and accompanying text.
45. Justice Douglas served on the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission from October 1934 until his appointment as an SEC Commissioner in
January 1936. He served as a commissioner until his appointment to the Supreme
Court in March 1939. He was chairman of the SEC from September 1937 to
March 1939. Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on Corporate and
Securities Regulation, 73 YALE L.J. 920 (1964).
46. The dissent emphasized the "thousands of investors who are the security
holders" in Alberto-Culver as the real victims of any financial loss due to fraud,
rather than the corporation itself.
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cated and unsophisticated people, the dissent attempted to lay to
rest the argument 7 that in transactions between sophisticated
buyers and sellers with substantially equal bargaining power the
dangers of gross overreaching and fraud are of less force in deciding
whether the provision for federal jurisdiction will be supplanted by
a compulsory arbitration agreement. Noting that no exception to
the anti-waiver provision of the Securities Exchange Act is made
for contracts that have an international character," the dissent
concluded that the rule of Wilko v. Swan was properly held by the
Court of Appeals to control the instant case.49
The instant decision will put all international contracts that
contain arbitration clauses on a par: no longer will international
contracts involving transfers of securities be outside the command
of the Arbitration Act. The Wilko decision, characterized by the
instant Court as a judicially carved-out exception to the clear provisions of the Arbitration Act, ° has been limited in scope of application to domestic transactions involving the sale of securities.
Whether to include an arbitration clause and the selection of an
arbitration forum are decisions that will now have to be made by
the engineer of the international commercial securities transaction. These choices will provide new flexibility in fashioning the
entire transaction. International contract formation may be facilitated as a consequence of the instant decision, and contract terms
may be included that are more advantageous to American businessmen in exchange for the beneficial alternative to the foreign
party of arbitration in a predetermined forum that may be less
partial to the American party than United States courts. The in47. The majority did not reach the issue of disparity of bargaining power. See
note 43 supra and accompanying text.
48. The dissent expressed fears that a securities transaction could escape the
regulation of the Securities Exchange Act by the inclusion of a nominal international contact, thus bringing the transaction within the scope of the instant decision.
49. The dissent saw another basis to approve the court of appeals holding,
finding in the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards an indication of congressional policy against
enforcement of arbitration agreements in contracts in which securities are involved. Specifically, article HI(3) of the Convention provides for a court to refrain
from referral to arbitration when it finds the agreement to arbitrate either null
and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed. The dissent concluded
that the instant agreement to arbitrate was void and inoperative under the antiwaiver provisions of the 1934 Act and so Congress in adopting the Convention
intended that the arbitration agreement not be enforced.
50. 417 U.S. at 517.
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stant decision can be seen as an awareness by the Court of the
improving quality of decision-making by international arbitration
tribunals5 ' and of the special considerations that an international
transaction involves. Henceforth, upon an alleged breach of an
international contract involving a transfer of securities and containing an arbitration agreement, dispute resolution will be more
orderly since a forum approved by both parties will be ready to
proceed. American courts will be compelled to order prosecution
of arbitration. Jockeying for a favorable judicial forum will thus be
less advantageous. Time and expense will be avoided and again
international trade will benefit from these economies. While international trade is the beneficiary of the Court's decision,52 the equity of the investor in the American corporation doing business
abroad, as the dissent noted, may be more vulnerable to the manipulation and negligence of corporate managers due to the newlycreated waiverability of the statutorily guaranteed right to sue in
federal district court for violations of the Securities Exchange Act.
On balance, however, the decision to respect arbitration agreements is desirable. The fear of the dissent that federal jurisdiction
will be avoided by the insertion of a nominal international contact
into an otherwise domestic transaction is not well founded, since
the Court indicated international contacts may exist that would
not be sufficient to invoke the rule of the instant decision. 53 Uncertainty will continue, however, as to the enforceability of arbitration agreements in a large number of contracts until the federal
courts formulate guidelines that can help determine whether the
international contacts in a securities related transaction are significant enough to trigger the Scherk rule. This unfortunate situation
can be dealt with by drafting international contracts with the
51. For a note by the former president of the American Arbitration Association on the growing use and quality of international arbitration, with suggestions
for improvements, see Straus, The Growing Consensuson InternationalCommercial Arbitration,68 AM. J. INT'L L. 709 (1974).
52. For a discussion of the important role of arbitration in regulating the

conduct of international business see M. DOMKE,

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

(1965);

Gardner, Economic and PoliticalImplications of International Commercial

Arbitration,in INTERNATIONAL

TRADE ARBITRATION

15, 16-17 (M. Domke ed. 1958).

53. The Court stated that the international aspects of some contracts would
be so insignificant or attenuated that the Wilko rule would apply. 417 U.S. at 517
n.11. No attempt was made, however, to lay down any guidelines; the Court
preferred to defer such decisions to future litigation wherein concrete controversies present the issues.
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Scherk rule in mind and including alternative provisions in case
the Wilko rule is held to govern the particular transaction.
Thomas C. Eklund

IMMIGRATION-AIEN COMMUTERS, BOTH DAILY AND SEASONAL,
WHO HAVE ONCE OBTAINED THE STATUS OF IMMIGRANTS ARE PROPERLY
CLASSIFIED AS SPECIAL IMMIGRANTS LAWFULLY ADMITTED FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE RETURNING FROM A TEMPORARY VISIT ABROAD
2
Plaintiffs, individual farm workers' and a workers committee,

brought a class action against defendants3 for injunctive and declaratory relief against the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) practice of classifying alien commuters4 as special immigrants5 "lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

. .

returning

from a temporary visit abroad." 6 A large number of workers live
in either Mexico or Canada and commute to daily or seasonal
jobs across the border in the United States. 7 Under the prevailing practice these aliens have been issued reentry permits or
"green cards" permitting unlimited border crossing.' Plaintiffs
1. The individual plaintiffs were Robert Bustos, an American citizen, and
Lupe Murguia, a Mexican national permanently residing in the United States,
both of whom were farm workers in California. Five farm workers from Texas were
allowed to intervene as plaintiffs. Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
2. The committee acted as a collective bargaining agent for farm workers.
Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 68 n.11 (1974).
3. The Attorney General administers and enforces all immigration laws, except certain duties charged to the Department of State and United States Public
Health Service. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Immigration Act]; See generally I C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.7 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
GORDON].
4. Aliens who reside in Canada or Mexico and commute daily or seasonally
to places of employment in the United States are alien commuters. 419 U.S. at
66. Note that a commuter is a person who has been granted permission in the past
to enter the United States as an immigrant.
5. Special immigrants are not subject to general numerical restrictions applicable to other immigrants. Certain other restrictions, both numerical and nonnumerical, are applied to special immigrants. See notes 20, 26 infra.
6. Immigration Act § 101(a)(27) (B). "The term 'lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege
of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with
the immigration laws, such states not having changed." Immigration Act §
1101(a)(20).
7. The Court stated that over 60,000 foreign laborers were commuters, that
250,000 family members were dependent on commuter income, that over $50
million annually was earned by commuters, and that 25 per cent to 30 per cent
of the income earned in some Mexican border communities was commuter
earned. 419 U.S. at 78; see REPORT, SELECT COMISSION ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE
IMMIGRATION

8.

NOTE,

104 (JAN.1968).
Aliens in the Fields: The "Green-Card Commuters" Under the Im-
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asserted that alien commuters should be categorized as nonimmigrants temporarily entering the United States for jobs,9 or, in the
alternative, as immigrants who had lost their status as permanent
residents because they did not live in the United States."0 Defendants argued that statutory interpretation and long agency practice supported the INS classification." The district court without
an opinion granted summary judgment for defendants. The court
of appeals reversed in part and remanded,' 2 holding that daily
commuters were properly classified, but that seasonal commuters
were not.'3 On writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court, held, affirmed in part and reversed in part. Alien commuters, both daily
and seasonal, who have once obtained the status of immigrants
are properly classified as special immigrants "lawfully admitted
for permanent residence . . . returning from a temporary visit

abroad." Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 (1974).
Before the passage of any major immigration legislation, alien
commuters crossed United States borders to their jobs without
hinderance.11 Beginning in 1921 the federal government enacted
the first comprehensive acts'5 in the area of immigration. The acts
enumerated several categories for immigrants, and the specific category in which the alien was placed became vitally important. The
migration and NaturalizationLaws, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1750 (1969).
9. "The term 'immigrant' means every alien except an alien who is within one
of the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens-. . . (H) an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning ... (ii) who
is coming temporarily to the United States to perform temporary services or labor,
if unemployed persons capable of performing such service or labor cannot be
found in this country ... ." Immigration Act § 1101(a)(15)(H).
10. 419 U.S. at 72.
11. See note 40 infra.
12. Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
13. The Circuit Court pointed out that seasonal commuters are generally alien
workers who were once part of the Bracero program, a program initiated between
Mexico and the United States to provide farm labor during the World War II labor
shortage. Congress, according to the court, allowed this program to lapse, indicating that it no longer wished to allow seasonal commuters unhampered access to
the United States.
The court also stated that seasonal commuters were not "returning from a
temporary visit abroad;" it asserted that the practice of classifying seasonal commuters as aliens returning from a temporary visit abroad violated the clear and
plain language of the statute. 481 F.2d at 483.
14. See GORDON, supra note 3, § 1-2.
15. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5; Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43
Stat. 153 [hereinafter cited as 1924 Act].
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Bureau of Immigration" interpreted these first statutes as placing
alien commuters in the category of nonimmigrants "visiting the
United States . . . for business."' 7 As visitors for business purposes, alien commuters could enter the United States without satisfying the stricter qualifications required of immigrants entering
for permanent residence. 8 In 1927 the Bureau reinterpreted these
statutes and classified alien commuters as immigrants admitted
for permanent residence." Thus, commuters as immigrants were
subject to applicable immigration quotas when they first applied

for immigrant status."0 The legislation placed no numerical restric-

tions on natives of the Western Hemisphere,' however, allowing
Canadian and Mexican citizens to commute across United States
borders without hinderance until 1952.2 The change of status,
therefore, was not particularly important to commuters from the
Western Hemisphere. In 1952 the immigration laws were substantially rewritten,23 and, as a means of maintaining the alien commuter system, the commuter status as an immigrant "lawfully
admitted for permanent residence" did take on importance. The
1952 Act placed immigrants "lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . returning from a temporary visit abroad" in the
category of "nonquota immigrants," later renamed "special immigrants." The 1952 Act also added a restrictive section that under
16. The Bureau of Immigration became part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 1933. Exec. Order No. 6166, June 10, 1933; see GORDON, supra
note 3, § 1.66.
17. 1924 Act § 3(2).
18. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workers v. Rogers, 186 F. Supp.
114, 117 (D.D.C. 1960).
19. Department of Labor, General Order No. 86 (April 1, 1927), reprinted in
[1927] 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 494-495 (1942). The commuter's place of work was
considered his domicile and each return to work was considered a return from a
temporary absence abroad. In re H.O., 5 I. & N. Dec. 716, 719 n.13 (1954).
20. 1924 Act §§ 5,6. In Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231 (1929), the
Supreme Court affirmed General Order No. 86 and stated that the 1924 Act and
other immigration statutes were enacted in part to protect American labor.
Therefore, the Court held that the word "business" (1924 Act § 3(2)), did not
apply to alien commuters and that they were not nonimmigrants free of quota
restrictions.
21. 1924 Act § 4.
22. GORDON, note 3 supra, § 1.2c-d, at 1-11.
23. Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 [hereinafter cited as
1952 Act] (citation to the "Immigration Act" refers to the 1952 Act as presently
amended; citation to the "1952 Act" refers to the Act as originally passed).
24. Immigration Act § 1101(a)(27).
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specified conditions prohibited certain aliens, including some
"nonquota immigrants," from entering the United States;25 the
section did not, however, affect, among others, immigrants "lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

. .

returning from a tem-

porary visit abroad."26 After the passage of the 1952 Act, the INS
continued the prior classification of alien commuters.Y WesternHemisphere commuters could, therefore, continue crossing the
border unhindered. In 1960 this concept of a commuter's permanent residency came under judicial attack. In Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workers v. Rogers 8 the district court held that
alien commuters were not "lawfully admitted for permanent resi25, 1952 Act § 212(a)(14). The section excluded these aliens from admission
to the United States if the Secretary of Labor certified that (a) sufficient workers
in the United States were available to perform their skills, or (b) "the employment of such aliens will adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the
workers in the United States similarly employed." See also Immigration Act §§
1153, 1101(a)(27).
26. Immigration Act § 1182(a)(14). See also Amalgamated Meat Cutters &
Butcher Workers v. Rogers, 186 F. Supp. 114, 118 (D.D.C. 1960). Those other than
immigrants "lawfully admitted for permanent residence returning from a temporary visit abroad" who were not affected by the restrictive statute were: (a)
relatives of persons already in the United States, (b) aliens fleeing political repression or natural calamities (Immigration Act § 1153), (c) former citizens of the
United States, (d) alien ministers needed to serve in the United States, and (e)
long-time alien employees of United States citizens (Immigration Act §§
1101(a)(27)(C)-(E)). Note that aliens attempting to become commuters for the
first time, that is, entering the United States for the first time, would be subject
to the restriction. 419 U.S. at 76.
27. In re H.O., 5 I. & N. Dec. 716 (1954). The Board of Immigration Appeals
stated that the commuter system was recognized in the legislative history of the
1952 Act. The Board stated that these discussions revealed no congressional dissatisfaction with the commuter procedure. Without clear statutory language requiring a mandatory change in the commuter scheme, the law could not be
construed as prohibiting this procedure.
28. 186 F. Supp. 114 (D.D.C. 1960). A union struck a company in El Paso,
Texas. Acting upon the union's petition, the Secretary of Labor certified that
admission of aliens for work at the company would "adversely affect the wages
and working conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed."
See note 19 supra. The Immigration and Naturalization Service excepted all
commuters from exclusionary action. The union brought suit to force the Service
to exclude commuters.
In this case the Service argued that the courts should accept the fiction that
an alien commuter's residence was his place of employment. 186 F. Supp. at 118
n.5. Later, the Service would argue that residency in the United States was not
necessary for a commuter to be an immigrant "lawfully admitted for permanent
residence." Texas AFL-CIO v. Kennedy, 330 F.2d 217, 218 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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dence." The court stated that aliens lawfully admitted for permanemt residence were excepted from exclusionary action but that
alien commuters did fit that category because they lived in a foreign country and not in the United States. The case, however,
became moot before it could be appealed, and the INS declined to
follow the case as precedent and expressed its opposition to Congress. 9 In 1965 the pertinent section of the 1952 Act was amended"
so that affected aliens would be subject to even tougher restrictions. An alien thereafter could not enter the United States seeking
a job unless the Secretary of Labor certified that no laborers in the
United States were available for the job and that the alien's entry
into the United States would not adversely affect the wages and
working conditions of similarly employed workers in the United
States." Those aliens previously classified as special immigrants
"lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

. .

returning from a

temporary visit abroad," however, were still not affected by the
section since the change did not alter the categories exempted
by the old statute. The ninth circuit court in Gooch v. Clark
maintained alien commuters in their favored category.32 The court
in that case held that alien commuters were immigrants, rather
than nonimmigrants, and that they had maintained their privilege
of residing permanently in the United States.n INS decisions and
Congressional acquiescence,
according to the court, supported
3 4
these conclusions.

29. STAFF OF HOUSE COI. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT WITH AMENDMENTS AND NOTES ON RELATED LAWS 210
(Comm. Print 4th ed. 1964); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. No. 1,
STUDY OF POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS, JUDICIAL DECISIONS CONSTRUING
CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 14 (Comm. Print
1963), as cited in Gooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1970). Only one other

attack on the commuter system occurred under the original 1952 Act, but the case
was dismissed on appeal because of plaintiff's lack of standing. Texas AFL-CIO
v. Kennedy, 330 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
30. Act of October 3, 1965, 79 Stat. 911 [hereinafter cited as 1965 Amendment].
31. The group of affected aliens remained the same after the 1965 Amendment. See 419 U.S. at 77; note 21 supra.
32. 433 F.2d at 74.
33. 433 F.2d at 79. The court also stated that the phrase "such status not
having changed" in the definition of "lawfully admitted for permanent residence"
referred to the status of being an immigrant or nonimmigrant, not to any place
of residence.
34. 433 F.2d at 79-81. Two other cases have dealt indirectly with the commuter issue. In 1968, the district court in Cermeno-Cerna v. Farrell,291 F. Supp.
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In the instant case the Supreme Court accepted the interpretation asserted by the court in Gooch v. Clark that an alien commuter is an immigrant.35 The Court restated the presumption created by statute that every alien is an immigrant unless he establishes a nonimmigrant status." In this case alien commuters did
not fit the category asserted by plaintiffs-that is, nonimmigrants
who can temporarily enter the United States only if no domestic
labor could be found. Commuters were not required to show the
absence of domestic labor when they applied for entrance into the
United States." The Court also argued that alien commuters had
not lost their status as immigrants "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" even though they did not live in the United States.
It pointed out that the statutory definition of the phrase "lawfully
admitted for permanent residence" means "the status of having
been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the
United States. . . ."I That is, the commuter has the privilege of
establishing permanent residence in the United States and that
privilege will not be denied him even though he does not intend to
reside here permanently. 9 Alien commuters, therefore, did not
need to reside within the United States in order to retain their
status as aliens "lawfully admitted for permanent residence." The
Court also emphasized that the alien commuter system reflected
the administrative practice of the INS and its predecessors since
at least 1927.1o It noted that "such long standing administrative
construction was entitled to great weight." Congress was held to
be aware of the system, and because it had not significantly
changed the Immigration and Nationality Act in this area, it had
acquiesed to the administrative policy of continuing the commuter
521 (C.D. Cal. 1968), while ruling on another issue of law, stated that it would
not invalidate the commuter system. In Sam Andrews' Sons v. Mitchell, 457 F.2d
745 (9th Cir. 1972), the ninth circuit court reasserted its ruling in the Gooch case
as a part of the discussion of another issue.
35. 419 U.S. at 70. The majority also accepted the Gooch interpretation of
"such status not having changed" clause contained in the Immigration Act §
1101(a)(20). See note 29 supra.
36. Immigration Act § 1184(b).
37. 419 U.S. at 71.
38. Immigration Act § 1101(a)(20). See note 7 supra.
39. 419 U.S. at 72.
40. In re Hoffman-Arvayo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 750 (1971); In re Wighton, 13 I. &
N. Dec. 683 (1971); In re Gerhard, 12 I. & N. Dec. 556 (1967); In re BurciagaSalcedo, 11 I. & N. Dec. 665 (1966); In re Bailey, 11 I. & N. Dec. 466 (1966); In
re M.D.S., 8 I. & N. Dec. 209 (1958); In re H.O., 5 I. & N. Dec. 716 (1954); In re
L., 4 I. & N. Dec. 454 (1951).
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system." Thus, alien commuters were immigrants "lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 4 2 Alien commuters were also
"returning from a temporary visit abroad." Both the majority and
dissent in the circuit court agreed on this point concerning daily
commuters, but the circuit court majority held that seasonal commuters were not returning from a temporary visit abroad. The
Supreme Court felt, however, that both daily and seasonal commuters were given the same status43 when they first became immigrants; both groups of commuters, therefore, should receive the
same treatment. Finally the Court pointed out that an adverse
decision in the instant case would deal a severe economic blow to
the communities near United States borders, cause a massive
immigration of former commuters to the United States, and
seriously harm relations between the United States and both
Mexico and Canada. 4 The Court concluded, therefore, that all
alien commuters, both daily and seasonal, who had obtained the
status of immigrants4 5 were properly classified as special immigrants "lawfully admitted for permanent residence. . . returning
from a temporary visit abroad."4
41.

419 U.S. at 74. See also S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 535 (1950).

42. 419 U.S. at 72.

43. The majority stated that the Court of Appeals had based its decision that
seasonal commuters were not immigrants lawfully admitted for permanent residence on the erroneous belief that the lapse of the Bracero system prevented the
entrance of seasonal commuters as immigrants "lawfully admitted for permanent
residence." The Court stated that the Bracero system, enacted under 56 Stat.
1759, applied only to nonimmigrant foreign labor and not to immigrant alien
commuters. 419 U.S. at 76.
44.

See note 7 supra.

45. The Court pointed out that this conclusion would apply only to alien
laborers who had received immigrant status prior to November 1, 1965, the effective date of an amendment to the immigration laws, which would require the
Secretary of Labor to certify that domestic labor is not sufficient and will not be
affected by the admission of an alien laborer as an immigrant lawfully admitted
for permanent residence for the first time. 79 Stat. 917; Immigration Act §
1182(a)(14).
46. The dissent argued that the majority's statutory interpretation violated
the "plain meaning" of the statutes and stated that the plain meaning of the
statutes should overcome the weight given any administrative construction.
Although Congress has been generally silent on the commuter problem, those
statutes which Congress has passed which are related to immigration are clearly
inconsistent with the majority's statutory interpretation. Therefore, according to
the dissent, Congress has not accepted the treatment of alien commuters as
immigrants "lawfully admitted for permanent residence .

.

. returning from a

temporary visit abroad." The dissent also stated that the social, political, and
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The Court in this opinion has firmly established the alien commuter's favored status under present statutes. In effect, the Court
has effectively precluded further judicial challenges to the commuter system. The only alternative remaining for opponents of the
alien commuter system would seem to be alteration of the immigration statutes. As matters now stand, the statutes confront aliens seeking admittance for the first time with severe statutory
restrictions,47 but no bills have been approved by Congress to destroy the privileges of those already classified as commuters."
Alien commuters, therefore, will continue to work in the United
States in large numbers for the near future, but the numbers will
decrease as those alien commuters who qualified under the older,
less restrictive program retire from the work force. In deciding the
instant case, the Court relied heavily on administrative construction of the statute in question,49 a result not so surprising in relation to the lack of clear aid from other sources: first, the statute
the Court sought to interpret was written in anything but "plain
language;""0 secondly, although since 1963 Congress has become
increasingly aware of the alien commuter system, it has done little
to clearly indicate its attitude toward that system;51 and thirdly,
the courts have been inconsistent in their interpretations, 2 while
economic factors cited by the majority are elements for the legislature to consider,
not the Court. The dissent furthermore observed that the decision of the majority
and the assertions of the government violated one of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's own rules, i.e., "in order to be exempt from the normal documentation requirements upon entry, an alien must be returning to his 'unrelinquished lawful permanent residence' from a 'temporary absence abroad.'" 8
C.F.R. § 211.1(6) (1974).
47. See Immigration Act § 1182(a)(14).
48. GORDON § 219 (Supp. 1975).
49. Immigration Act § 1101(a)(27)(B).
50. Of the five courts which dealt with the commuter system prior to the
instant case, two stated that all commuters were not entitled to favored status,
two said all commuters were entitled to favored status, and one said daily commuters were entitled to favored status and seasonal commuters were not. See
notes 8, 24, 28, 31 supra.
51.

REPORT, SELECT COMMISSION ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE IMMIGRATION

(Jan.

1968); Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, H.R. Rep. No. 12667, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 181, 183 (1969);
Hearings on Border Commuter Labor Problems before Subcomm. on Migratory
Labor, Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 5A,
5B (1969); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. No. 1, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS.
ADMISSION OF ALIENS INTO THE UNITED STATES FOR TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AND

156 (Comm. Print 1963).
See note 49 supra.

COMMUTER WORKERS,

52.
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the INS has consistently ruled that alien commuters have a favored status." The Court, therefore, as it indicated, had no other
sources to which it could turn. In all probability, the Court would
have given much less weight to the administrative construction if
any other source had clearly indicated a preference for a particular
construction of the statute in question. In addition, the INS interpretation coincided with the majority's political, economic, and
social views. 4 Therefore, once the majority discovered a fairly reasonable statutory interpretation, which would coincide with the
decisions of the Service and the policy stand of the majority, the
holding of the Court was assured. In conclusion, the Supreme
Court has conclusively placed alien commuters in a category which
will continue the free access of commuters to domestic labor opportunities. In doing so, the majority reasonably relied on its only
consistent source of authority and its own policy considerations.
Thomas F. Taylor

53. See note 40 supra.
54. Opposing policy considerations have been suggested. It can be argued that
a continuing alien commuter system maintains a depressed pay scale near the
Mexican border and thwarts union organization efforts in the area. Note, Aliens
in the Fields: The "Green-Card Commuter" Under the Immigrationand Naturalization Laws, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1750 (1969).

INSURANCE-WAR

RISK EXCLUSION CLAUSE DOES NOT BAR RECOVERY UNDER AN ALL RISK POLICY FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

Plaintiff' brought suit against defendant insurers' to recover for
the loss of an airliner under all risk 3 and war risk4 insurance policies. Two men, allegedly acting for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),5 hijacked one of plaintiff's planes while
en route from Brussels to New York and forced the plane to land
in Beirut, where a demolitions expert with explosives joined the
hijackers. The aircraft, a Boeing 747, was then flown to Cairo,
where the PFLP destroyed the aircraft after evacuating the passengers. In determining which insurer was to bear the loss, the district
1. The plaintiff in the present case was Pan American World Airways, Inc., a
United States air carrier engaged in international passenger service.
2. The defendants consisted of Pan American's insurers: (1) Aetna Casualty
& Surety Company; (2) United States; and (3) Phillip Graybell Wright, representing Lloyd's underwriting syndicate.
3. All risk insurance covers all losses except those resulting from specific
exclusions stated in the particular policy. In this case the all risk coverage of Pan
American was provided by three separate groups. One-third of the coverage was
provided by members of the United States Aviation Insurance Group (USAIG),
of which Aetna is a member; one-sixth by members of Lloyd's underwriting syndicate, and one-half by members of Associated Aviation Underwriters (AAU), another American group. These three groups include all of the underwriters in the
world who supply aviation all risk insurance to American air carriers. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir.
1974).
4. Lloyd's underwriting syndicate and various companies of the London war
risk insurance market covered direct physical loss or damage by the perils listed
in the war risk exclusion clause of Pan American's all risk policy. The United
States Government provided coverage for loss or damage resulting from "[w]ar,
invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities (whether declared or not), civil war,
rebellion, revolution or insurrection, military or usurped power or confiscation
and/or nationalization or requisition or destruction by any government or public
or local authority or by any independent unit or individual engaged in irregular
warfare." 505 F.2d at 995. The government excluded coverage for loss covered
under any other policy in effect for Pan American. These policies comprised the
total war risk insurance coverage of the plaintiff.
5. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is the second
largest group in the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) after Al Fatah.
"The militant Marxist" PFLP opposes not only Israel, but also such reactionary
Arab monarchs as Jordon's King Hussein and Saudi Arabia's former King Faisal.
The self-proclaimed goal of the PFLP is "the creation of a secular Palestine to
replace Israel in which Jews, Christians and Moslems would live together." TiE,
Oct. 14, 1974, at 54.
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court held that the war risk exclusion clause' of the all risk insurers
did not preclude liability on the policy, since the PFLP's terrorist
activities toward non-belligerent civilians were not warlike. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed. A war risk exclusion clause does not bar recovery under an
all risk policy for damages resulting from terrorist activities, unless
such activities are clearly excluded from the coverage of the policy.7 PanAmerican World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
Through the years, the courts have carefully defined the terms
contained in war risk and all risk insurance policies. Some of the
terms most frequently analyzed by the courts in their consideration of insurance cases involving war and conflict have included
the following: (1) military or usurped power, (2) war, (3) warlike
operations, (4) insurrection, (5) civil commotion, and (6) riot.
1. Military or usurped power.-To give rise to a military or
usurped power, it is necessary that the belligerents attain the status of a de facto government.' One of the first cases to discuss this
requirement was Drinkwater v. The Corporation of London
Assurance.' Drinkwater stated that a military or usurped power
involves an invasion by a foreign power or an internal rebellion in
which the insurgent force or foreign power assumes the reins of
government by making laws and by punishing for failure to obey
6. The war risk clause of the all risk insurance policy excluded coverage for
losses from destruction of the property insured by any military or usurped power,
or resulting from war, civil war, insurrection, warlike operations, riots, or civil
commotion. 505 F.2d at 994.
7. In accordance with the canon of contra proferentem, an ambiguous insurance term will be construed against the drafter. See Sincoff v. Liberty Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 11 N.Y.2d 386, 183 N.E.2d 899, 230 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1962).
8. A de facto government is characterized as maintaining its existence in its
territories by superior military power against the authority of the lawful government. Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 1, 9-11 (1868) (for the purpose of
determining the meaning of a contract for "dollars" during the Civil War, the
Confederacy was a de facto government); MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416
(1913) (the United States had no authority to collect customs duties from ports
in the Phillipines under insurgent control of a de facto government); The Three
Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1897) (Harlan dissent) (Cuban insurgents lacked administration and government in areas they overran and therefore could not be accorded
de facto status).
9. 95 Eng. Rep. 863 (K.B. 1767) (fire resulting from the actions of a mob was
not considered a loss by a military or usurped power for the purpose of insurance
coverage); see City Fire Ins. Co. v. J. & H.P. Corlies, 21 Wend. 367, 369-70 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1839) (citing Drinkwaterwith approval).
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those laws."0 Hence, the conquering force must establish a de facto
government. Other British courts have held similarly that for an
internal rebellion to give rise to a military or usurped power it
"must be conducted by authority."" In United States history, the
clearest example of military or usurped power took place during
the Civil War. In Insurance Co. v. Boon,12 the Supreme Court
viewed military or usurped power as that "power exerted by an
invading foreign enemy, or by an internal armed force in rebellion,
sufficient to supplant the laws of the land and displace the constituted authorities.''13

2. War.-War has been defined as the employment of force between governments, at least de facto. 4 It has also been defined as
the utilization by two or more states of their armed forces for
conquest and for the imposition of such conditions for peace as the
victor pleases. 5 In Vanderbilt v. Traveler's Insurance Co.," a New
York court was confronted with the death of a passenger resulting
from the sinking of the Lusitania during World War I. The
Vanderbilt court found that this death was not covered by life
insurance, since the policy in question excluded coverage for death
resulting from war. The court reasoned that the destruction of the
Lusitania resulted directly from war between Germany and Great
Britain, both sovereigns, and that the actions taken in sinking the
Lusitania were pursuant to the instructions of a sovereign government. However, war need not be waged between fully sovereign
entities 17 nor need it be formally declared," before it can legally
10. 95 Eng. Rep. at 863.
11. Langdale v. Mason, 1 Bennett's Fire Ins. Cas. 16 (K.B. 1780). As an

example, the court theorized that if the rebels had ordered a house to be set on
fire in 1745 when they came to Derby, that would have been by authority. 1
Bennett's Fire Ins. Cas. at 17. In other words, a usurped power must have at least
a colorable claim to governmental power.
12. 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 117 (1877).
13. 95 U.S. at 127.
14. See The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666-67 (1862) (The
Prize Cases) (war is "that state in which a nation prosecutes its right by force");

Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 39-40 (1800) (The Eliza) (war is a forcible contest
of arms between governments at least de facto in nature).
15. L. OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 54 (7th ed. Lauterpacht
ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM].
16. 112 Misc. 248, 184 N.Y.S. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd mem., 202 App. Div.

738, 194 N.Y.S. 986 (1922), aff'd mem., 235 N.Y. Rep. 514, 139 N.E. 715 (1923).
17. See generally Hamdi & Ibraham Mango Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 291 F.2d
437 (2d Cir. 1961) (war that existed in 1948 between Palestinian forces in Haifa
and the Haganah before the proclamation of the state of Israel).
18. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260, 264 (10th Cir. 1946)
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exist for insurance purposes. In Welts v. Connecticut Mutual Life
Insurance Co.," the court held that the homicide of a civilian working on a Union Army railroad crew during the Civil War was not a
consequence of war. The court reasoned that since the murderers
wore no insignia and did not otherwise indicate involvement with
a sovereign government, their act could not be one of war. Thus,
although war need not be waged between sovereign entities, elements of sovereignty in a destroying force greatly increase the likelihood that the destruction will be deemed a consequence of war.
In other decisions, courts have established that guerilla groups
must have at least some incidents of sovereignty before their activities can be considered war.2" For example guerillas can enjoy privileges similar to those accorded to members of belligerent armed
forces if they comply with certain requirements under Article I of
the Hague Regulation and the Geneva Convention.2 ' However,
"individuals who are not members of regular forces and who take
up arms to commit hostile acts singly and severally are still subject
to be treated as war criminals and shot."2 The United States has
3
likewise refused to grant guerilla activity the status of war.
3. Warlike operations.-Warlike operations generally exist only
as part of an actual or intended conflict between combative forces
(where the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in loss of life and a formal
declaration by Congress was not essential to the existence of a state of war for
insurance coverage).
19. 48 N.Y. 34 (1871).
20. See, e.g., Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
505 F.2d 989, 1013 (1974).
21. Guerillas will be accorded the privileges of armed forces of the belligerent
if the same requirements are met as are present to qualify for POW status under
the Geneva Convention. OPPENHEMI § 80. Article 4 of the Geneva Convention on
Prisoner of War states, "one is a prisoner of war if (1) he is a member of a
national armed force, or (2) if he is a member of a group that fulfills the following
four conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his

subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c)
that of carrying arms openly; and (d) that of conducting their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war."
It would be hard to imagine a guerilla activity that would accord POW status.
While there is usually a hierarchical command, the members are not likely to bear

fixed insignia recognizable at a distance, nor will they always bear arms openly.
"In short, the guerilla under the Geneva Convention remains what he has always

been: an outlaw."

BOND, THE RULES OF

BOND].

22.

OPPENHEIM § 80.

23.

BOND

at 38.

RIOT 38 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
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of belligerents.24 They do not include intentional violence by political groups upon civilians of nonbelligerent countries located far
from any warfare.25 They may include, however, acts not performed by belligerents per se, but acts of a general kind or character to which belligerents 2 have recourse in wary
4. Insurrection.-An insurrection is a rebellion of citizens in resistance to their government. 8 It requires (1) a violent uprising by
a group or movement (2) for the specific purpose of overthrowing
the constituted government and seizing its powers." Not only must
the insurgent force intend to bring about the overthrow of the
constituted government, but it apparently must intend this result
as a direct consequence of its violent actions. In Home Insurance
Co. v. Davila,31 the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico staged a series
24. Clan Line Steamers, Ltd. v. Liverpool and London War Risks Ins. Ass'n,
Ltd., [1943] 1 K.B. 209, 221. Where the collision and sinking of a ship carrying
steel rounds to be converted into shells for use in World War 1i was not considered
to be engaged in a warlike operation. The operation may be performed as preparation to the actual acts of belligerency or it may be performed as subsequent to
such acts, but there must be a sufficiently close connection to constitute a part
of an act of belligerency. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 178 F.2d 488 (2d
Cir. 1949), aff'd, 340 U.S. 54 (1950) (loss arising from collision with warship in
time of war); International Dairy Eng'r Co. v. American Home Assurance Co.,
352 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1973) (burning
of a warehouse during the Vietnamese conflict).
25. See generally Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973) (hijacking by the
PFLP was not even discussed as possibly arising from a warlike operation).
26. A state of belligerency exists when there is: (1) existence of a responsible
government; (2) possession of territory; (3) existence of an army that follows the
law of war; (4) recognition by third states of belligerency; and (5) existence of
general hostilities. See OPPENHEIM

§

76.

27. Although most examples of warlike operations have involved military or
naval forces in time of actual war, there are instances where acts of United States
forces not engaged in an actual war were regarded as warlike operations. See, e.g.,
Flota Mercante Dominicana v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 272 F.Supp. 540
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (the firing of artillery was a warlike operation against the Dominican rebels even though the United States was not engaged in an actual war).
28. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 946 (4th rev. ed. 1968). A clear example of a state
of insurrection took place in Cuba during 1859-1899 when Cuban insurgents rebelled against the Spanish Government. In following the executive recognition of
this activity as an insurrection, the Supreme Court termed the rebellion "an
actual conflict of arms in resistance of the authority of a government." The Three
Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 63-66 (1897).
29. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 368 F. Supp.
1098, 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
30. 212 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1954).
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of attacks on towns for the purpose of making the island independent of the United States. The Davila court found that such actions might constitute an insurrection if their purpose was to overthrow the government. However, if the acts of the Nationalists had
been to "fire a shot heard around the world," then the outbreaks
could not have been considered an insurrection. 1
5. Civil commotion.-A civil commotion is a local domestic disturbance that is confined to the immediate area of its occurrence. 2
6. Riot.-The definition of a riot for insurance purposes appears
to be in some disarray. It has been defined as any gathering of three
or more persons with the common design to do an unlawful act
with the apparent intention to use force or violence against anyone
in opposition. 3 Riot has also been defined as merely requiring a
34
tumult or commotion at the time of the action.
In the instant case the defendant all risk insurers sought to deny
payment of plaintiffs claim of loss by virtue of a war risk exclusion
clause that precluded recovery for destruction caused by any of the
six acts above. The court first analyzed the PFLP's acts in light of
a military or usurped power. 5 The only "power" displayed by the
PFLP was the holding of hostages. The PFLP did not control any
territory against the lawful government of any state. Moreover,
what territory they occupied was at the sufferance of the state in
which it was located. 31 With this in mind, the court concluded that
31. 212 F.2d at 738.
32. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. War Eagle Coal Co., 295 F. 663 (4th Cir. 1924)
(a fire loss was covered by the insured's policy that excluded loss arising from riot
or civil commotion because there was no tumult or disturbance). The cases that

discuss civil commotion as compared to riot would seem to indicate a fine distinction between the two based on the degree of the disturbance. A civil commotion
is a disturbance more serious than a riot but less serious than an insurrection.
Brief for Appellant at 14, Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
33. INA v. Rosenberg, 25 F.2d 635, 636 (2d Cir. 1928) (five armed men threatened employees of a garment factory with guns and destroyed property during a
labor dispute held a riot for insurance purposes). While the court's conclusion
indicates the necessity of a common design for a riot to occur, it is probable that
a riot can occur absent such a requirement.
34. See Brous v. Imperial Assurance Co., 130 Misc. 450, 224 N.Y.S. 136 (Sup.
Ct. 1927), aff'd mem., 223 App. Div. 713, 227 N.Y.S. 777 (Ct. App. 1928) (six
armed men threatening to kill employees and subsequently destroying garments
held to be a riot for insurance purposes). Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. War Eagle Coal
Co., 295 F. 663, 665 (4th Cir. 1924) (where a fire resulted and insured's policy

covered the loss since there was no tumultuous assembly prior to the fire).
35. 505 F.2d at 1009.
36. Referring to the camps of Palestinian refugees permitted by King Hussein
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the PFLP did not possess sufficient incidents of a de facto 7 govern-

ment to constitute a military or usurped power." Next the court
considered whether the PFLP's actions were war.39 The court found
that the governments of Lebanon and Jordon negotiated with the
PFLP only as a terrorist who holds hostages. In addition, no Arab
state recognized the PFLP. The hijackers did not wear insignia nor
did they openly carry arms. These actions were, therefore, not
sufficient to be recognized as war or a part of a war,4" since they
had no incidents of sovereignty. The PFLP's activities were next
considered in relation to a warlike operation.42 Plaintiff's flight was
not involved in any warlike operation of its own. It carried no cargo
of military stores and was not even destined for the Middle East.
As a result, the court found that the PFLP's acts did not fall within
the connotation of a warlike operation.43 In examining the PFLP's
actions in regard to an insurrection,44 the court found that the
hijacking did not occur with the intent to overthrow.King Hussein.
Moreover, had there been an insurrection in Jordon at the time of
the hijacking, such an insurrection could not have caused the loss
of the 747 in Cairo. Therefore, the court reasoned that the loss
could not have resulted from an insurrection in Jordon. The court
next viewed the PFLP's activities in relaion to a "civil commotion."45 It reasoned that a civil commotion refers to a disorder that
occurs among fellow citizens or within the limits of one community." Such a definition did not comprehend a loss occurring in
the air space above two continents. Therefore, the destruction of
the plane could not be considered a loss resulting from a civil
commotion. Finally, on the question of riot as the cause of the loss,
the court recognized three lines of authority defining riot for insurance purposes.47 The court did not hold any of the three as controlin Jordon and the camps in Lebanon. See note 55 infra.
37. See note 8 supra.
38. 505 F.2d at 1009.
39. 505 F.2d at 1012.
40. 505 F.2d at 1013.
41. 505 F.2d at 1013.
42. 505 F.2d at 1016-17.
43. The court in the instant decision was treating warlike operations as those
operations that exist only as a part of an actual conflict between combative forces
of belligerents. Since there was no war between the United States and the PFLP
there could be no warlike operation.
44. 505 F.2d at 1017-18.
45. 505 F.2d at 1019-20.
46. 505 F.2d at 1019.
47. 505 F.2d at 1021. The court recognized three lines of authority concerning
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ling since the insurers failed to meet the definitional requirements
for riot that the insurers themselves propounded and that was the
most favorable to their case. 8 With these findings, the court concluded that the insurers failed to bring the acts of the PFLP within
the war risk exclusion clause of their all risk policy and were,
therefore, liable for the loss caused by a non-warlike act.
The court's holding reflects the refusal by the United States and
other Western countries to treat terrorist actions as anything but
criminal."9 This position has been exemplified in the three hijacking conventions-the Tokyo Convention," the Hague Convention, 1 and the Montreal Convention. 2 Insistance on treating terrorist activities as criminal or illegal has hindered their recognition
under the traditional terms discussed above. In effect, terrorist
activities are becoming a modern form of war by third world nations. This development urges a redefinition of the traditional classifications and recognition of guerilla organizations such as the
PFLP. However, the refusal of industrial nations to recognize guerthe definition of riot; however, such fine distinctions were drawn that a more
accurate interpretation of the case law would probably indicate only two lines of
authority. See notes 33, 34 supra and accompanying text.
48. 505 F.2d at 1021. The insurers contended that a riot arose whenever three
or more persons had the common design to do an unlawful act and the apparent
intention to use force or violence against anyone in opposition. The court found
that at the time of the initial hijacking there were only two PFLP members
involved and rejected the insurers' proposition that the critical time to be considered was that of the destruction of the plane.
49. Before the General Assembly of the United Nations former Secretary of
State William Rogers described the United States position on terrorism as follows: "The issue is not war-war between states, civil war, or revolutionary war.
The issue is not the strivings of people to achieve self-determination and independence ....

We are all aware that, aside from the psychotic and the purely

felonious, many criminal acts of terrorism derive from political origins. We all
recognize that issues such as self-determination must continue to be addressed
seriously by the international community. But political passion, however deeply
held, cannot be a justification for criminal violence against innocent persons."
Address by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, United Nations General Assembly, September 25, 1972, Press Release USUN-104(72), as cited in Hannay,
International Terrorism: The Need for a Fresh Perspective, 8 INT'L LAWYER 268
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Hannay].
50. Convention of Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, September 14, 1963, [1969] 3 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768 (relating
primarily to the return of hijacked airlines).
51. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, [19711 2 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192.
52. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971,

-

U.S.T.

, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
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illa activities as anything other than criminal hinders such a redefinition. The majority of United Nations members supports the
right to self-determination of all peoples and the right to "wage
wars of national liberation against oppressors."53 In addition, during the United Nations debates on terrorism, several members
expressed concern that proposed conventions could be interpreted
to restrict the legitimate activities of "freedom fighters." 54 With
this it would seem impossible to reconcile the points of view of the
"Third World Nations"5 5 and of the industrial countries. For the
modem world to achieve an effective control on terrorism, it will
be necessary to understand and respect the views of other nations
that condone such acts as a legitimate method of war. This is
essential because these nations have not adhered to any of the
present conventions and will most likely not adhere to any of the
proposed conventions." Philosophical agreement with the actions
of the Palestinian guerillas is immaterial, the states concerned by
terrorism must recognize that such acts cannot be dismissed simply as common crimes. 57 By construing the PFLP's activities as
criminal rather than warlike, the court refuses to distinguish between warlike hijackings and non-warlike hijackings. As a result,
under the policies in existence at the time of this case, the all risk
insurers are forced either to exclude all hijackings from coverage
or to cover it totally. If hijacking coverage is excluded, United
States airlines must obtain coverage on the London market for
53.

G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doe A/4684 (1960).

The Palestinian organizations view their activities as a war of freedom to create
a secular Palestine to replace Israel. Such activity is aimed at Israel and all its
supporters. See note 5 supra.
54. Hannay, supra note 49, at 275 n.43.
55. Lebanon, like Syria, has permitted enormous numbers of refugees from
Israeli-occupied areas of Palestine to live in Lebanon for a temporary period until
their lands are restored to them. Most importantly, Lebanon has permitted these
refugee camps to be the headquarters of various liberation groups. Washington
Post, May 11, 1973, § A, at 1, col. 6; Id., May 14, 1973, § A, at 6, col, 3; Id., May
18, 1973, § A, at 22, col. 2.
56. Hannay, supra note 49, at 276.
57. Id. at 279.
58. The all risk insurers contend they do not want to exclude all hijackings
from their coverage. They have divided hijacking into two categories: (1) excluding from coverage those hijackings relating to the "war and other risk exclusion
clauses," and (2) extending coverage to all other hijackings. Brief for Appellant
at 138, Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d
989 (2d Cir. 1974).
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non-warlike hijackings 9 This would force United States airlines to
deal with two categories of aviation insurers. The result would be
a loss of premium volume to the American all risk insurers. If
American all risk insurers included hijacking in their coverage,
they would be forced to insure against warlike hijackings. Such
coverage is considered to be unprofitable based on the thin market
for war risk insurance." In an attempt to remedy this situation, the
United States all risk insurers have adopted the Common North
American Airline War Exclusion Clause (CWEC).1 Through the
use of buy-back provisions"2 and a clause excluding coverage of
irregular warfare, 3 the all risk insurers hope to cover non-warlike
hijackings and exclude warlike hijackings. This latter course would
remedy the situation posed by the instant case. On the other hand,
the courts have yet to interpret irregular warfare, and only the
59. Id. at 139 n.68.
60. American domestic carriers do not require war risk insurance. The only
carriers that require such insurance are the United States international carriers,
such as Pan American. As a result, the market is too thin to protect the insurance
companies from excessively concentrated losses. On the other hand, domestic
carriers all require insurance for non-warlike hijackings. Id. at 138. A plane that
is involved in a non-warlike hijacking is usually returned intact, whereas a plane
that is involved in a warlike hijacking is usually held for ransom and totally
destroyed if the ransom demands are not met.
61. The new exclusion clause excludes losses arising from: "(a) War, invasion,
acts of foreign enemies, hostilities ... civil war, rebellion, revolution or insurrection, military or usurped power ... (b) Any hostile detonation of any weapon of
war employing atomic or nuclear fission and/or fusion .

.

. (c) other than as

excluded in Paragraph (a) hereinabove, any unlawful seizure, diversion or exercise of control of the aircraft, or attempt, threat, by force or threat ... (d) Other
than as excluded in Paragraph (a) hereinabove, strikes, lockouts, labor disturbances, riots, civil commotion. (e) Other than as excluded in Paragraph (a) hereinabove, vandalism, sabotage, malicious act or other act intended to cause loss or
damage." Comment, A Legal Response to Terrorist Hijacking and Insurance
Liability, 6 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 1167, 1195 n.191 (1974).
62. Section A, dealing with warlike risks and irregular warfare, and section
B, concerning loss from nuclear weapons, are mandatory exclusions. The exclusions found in section C (hijacking), D (strikes, riots, and civil commotion), and
E (intentional damage) are subject to "buy-back provisions." For an additional
premium the insured can purchase coverage for any one or more of these three
exclusions.
63. By buy-back sections C and E, the insured can receive coverage for intentional and unintentional hijacking. The mandatory section A would then exclude
coverage for loss resulting from war and irregular warfare.
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future will reveal whether the all risk insurers have achieved their
objective. 4
Ralph Vinciguerra

64. The instant decision demonstrates the need for parties to an insurance
contract to express their intent in clear and unambiguous language. The canon
of contraproferentem will place a heavy burden on insurers to constantly review
their policies to determine whether they are adequate in light of changing conditions. If such review had been made prior to this case and the CWEC had been
in effect, there is a strong possibility that the terrorist acts would have been
excluded from the all risk insurance coverage.

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION-U.N.
RECOGNITION

AND

ENFORCEMENT

OF

CONVENTION ON THE

FOREIGN

ARBITRAL

AWARDS-DEFENSES RAISED AGAINST ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARD WILL BE NARROWLY CONSTRUED BY U.S. COURTS TO
COMPLY WITH PRO-ENFORCEMENT POLICY OF THE CONVENTION

Plaintiff contractor' agreed to build and to start up a paperboard
mill for defendant 2 in Alexandria, Egypt. The work was near completion in 1967 when Arab-Israeli tensions heightened. Egypt subsequently broke diplomatic ties with the United States and expelled all Americans who did not obtain special visas. Plaintiff's
American employees, not having applied for the special visas, left
the country, citing the contract's force majeure clause to excuse
the postponement of work.3 Defendant completed the mill and
sought damages for breach of contract. When plaintiff refused to
settle, defendant invoked the contract's arbitration clause. When
the arbitral board4 found no good faith effort by plaintiff to complete the project and awarded damages and costs to defendant,
plaintiff brought the instant suit seeking declaratory relief to prevent collection of the foreign arbitral award.5 Contending that the
foreign arbitral award did not comply with the requirements of the
United Nations Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards,' plaintiff raised several defenses derived from article V of the Convention 7 against enforcement of the
award: (1) enforcement would violate the public policy of the
United States;8 (2) the matters arbitrated were inappropriate for
arbitration;9 (3) the arbitral tribunal denied plaintiff adequate
1. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., an American corporation.
2. Socit6 G~ndrale de lIndustrie du Papier (Ratka), an Egyptian corporation.
3. The force majeure clause excused delays in performance due to causes
reasonably beyond the contractor's control.
4. The arbitration clause provided for a three-person arbitral tribunal governed by the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce.
5. Defendant also sought assessment of damages and double costs against

plaintiff for frivolous appeal.
6. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 84 Stat. 692, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 38.
7. See text of article V quoted at note 36 infra.
8. Plaintiff argued that United States foreign policy interests in the Middle
East demanded that plaintiff, as a loyal American citizen, abandon the project.
9. Plaintiff contended that foreign policy issues were involved in the work
dispute and that these issues should not be decided by arbitration.
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opportunity to present its case;"° (4) the award was based upon
resolution of issues outside the scope of the arbitration agreement;" and (5) the award was in manifest disregard of the law. 2
The district court 13 granted summary judgment for defendant. On
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held, affirmed. The thrust of the Convention is to facilitate the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and to effectuate
that purpose any defense to a foreign arbitral award will be narrowly construed. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Soci&t6
Gn~rale de l'Industrie du Papier (Ratka), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir.
1974).
The difficulty of enforcing foreign arbitral awards 4 has been a
long-standing problem. At common law, courts treated all arbitration with hostility, maintaining that through arbitration the parties were attempting to oust the jurisdiction of the courts. 5 In 1925,
however, the Federal Arbitration Act 6 proclaimed arbitral agreements to be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.' 17 Despite the
clarity of that language, agreements to arbitrate and the enforce10. Plaintiff charged that the refusal by the arbitral tribunal to delay proceedings to accomodate the speaking schedule of one of plaintiff's witnesses amounted
to a denial of plaintiff's opportunity to present its case.
11. Plaintiff directed this defense at the award of damages for loss of production, which plaintiff argued was expressly excluded by the contract between the
parties.
12. Plaintiff raised the defense of "manifest disregard" to attack the arbitral
tribunal's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
13. The case originated in the New York Supreme Court. Defendant removed
the case to the federal district court pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 205, which authorizes
removal from state courts of cases dealing with the recognition or enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards covered by the Convention, and 9 U.S.C. § 203, which
empowers federal district courts to entertain such cases.
14. Article I of the Convention defines foreign arbitral awards as those "made
in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought .... [The Convention] shall also apply to

arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought." The Convention adopts what is known as the
"territorial" rather than the "national" approach to arbitral awards, creating
implications for the draftsmen of arbitration clauses falling under the Convention. See Quigley, Convention on ForeignArbitral Awards, 58 A.B.A.J. 822

(1972).
15. E.g., J.T. Williams & Bro. v. Branning Mfg. Co., 154 N.C. 205, 70 S.E.
290 (1911); Dunton v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 104 Me. 372, 71 A. 1037 (1908).
16. United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as 1925 Act].
17. 1925 Act § 2.
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ment of arbitral awards continued to encounter judicial resistance."8 One of the major issues in these cases was whether the 1925
Act applied to the states as well as to the federal government. 9 In
1959, in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 0 the
Second Circuit held that the 1925 Act created federal substantive
law and that questions of the validity and the interpretation of
arbitration agreements were governed by federal law, not state
law. 21 The Supreme Court accepted this construction of the 1925
Act in Prima Paint Corp. v. Conklin Manufacturing Co.2 2 Even
accepting this principle, the enforceability of foreign arbitral
awards pursuant to the 1925 Act remained questionable because
the Act contains no provision aimed explicitly at foreign awards.n
18. For an account of the ways in which courts dealt with arbitration agreements see Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d
Cir. 1942).
19. This debate had its roots in several important Supreme Court decisions.
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court held that federal
courts could not create substantive law in diversity cases, thereby overruling
Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842). Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945),
amplified Erie by stating that matters in a diversity action which were "outcome
determinative" were to be tried according to state law. Then in Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956), the Court found that the jurisdictional
treatment of arbitration was "outcome determinative" and raised the question
whether the 1925 Act was applicable at all in diversity cases. The issue was not
decided because the Court determined the contract in question was purely intrastate and therefore not covered by the 1925 Act.
20. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
21. 271 F.2d at 409.
22. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). The soundness of the reasoning in the DevonshirePrima-Paintline of cases is still questioned by commentators. See, e.g., Comment, InternationalCommercial Arbitrationunder the United Nations Convention and the Amended FederalArbitrationStatute, 47 WASH. L. Rav. 441 (1972).
This dispute has been bypassed by congressional implementation of the Convention. The Arbitration Act of 1970, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as 1970 Act]. District courts now have original jurisdiction over disputes falling
under the Convention (9 U.S.C. § 203), and cases may be removed from state
courts (9 U.S.C. § 205).
23. Attempts to apply the 1925 Act to foreign arbitral awards through certain
sections, primarily sections 8 and 9, received conflicting reactions from the courts,
and hence no controlling authority resulted. Konstanstindis v. S.S. Tarsus, 248
F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 354 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1965); Danielson v.
Entra Rios Rys. Co., 22 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1927) (court had power to enter decree
on foreign arbitral award); contra, The Silverbrook, 18 F.2d 144 (E.D. La. 1927)
(court did not have the power to confirm foreign arbitral award). In Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 n.5 (1974), the Supreme Court indicated
that section 1 of the 1925 Act covered an international agreement to arbitrate

938

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 8: 935

Consequently, prior to the last few years, few federal court decisions could be found in which a foreign arbitral award was enforced;2 4 actual enforcement occurred most frequently in New York
state courts, which adopted a liberal approach to the enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards.25 Multilateral treaties, such as the Geneva Protocol of 192328 and the Geneva Convention of 1927,27 which
attempted to produce widespread enforcement of arbitral awards,
were not acceded to by the United States, primarily because the
federal government was constrained from adopting arbitration28
rules which would conflict with arbitration statutes of the states.
Regardless, these early multilateral agreements proved ineffective
in providing for enforcement of foreign awards, due to inherent
defects such as placing the burden of proving every issue upon the
party seeking to enforce the award. 9 Commencing with the 1946
treaty with Nationalist China,"0 however, the United States has
sought to facilitate recognition of the validity of foreign awards by
although the Convention would clearly have encompassed the agreement in question.
24. Standard Magnesium Corp. v. Fuchs, 251 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1957); San
Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminats Ltd., 293 F.2d
796 (9th Cir. 1961).
25. Gilbert v. Bernstein, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931) (New York public
policy permitted New York resident to submit to foreign arbitral procedures);
Sargent v. Monroe, 268 App. Div. 123, 49 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1944) (English final
arbitral award valid and binding upon New York resident).
26. Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, adopted
September 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301. Text in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION
283 (M. Domke ed. 1958).
27. Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, adopted September 24, 1923, 27
L.N.T.S. 158, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 283, 285. Both the
1923 Protocol and the 1927 Convention were expressly abrogated as to contracting
states to the 1970 Convention by article VII(2).
28. For similar reasons the United States did not accede to hemispheric arbitration agreements such as the Code of Private International Law (Codigo Bustamente), Feb. 20, 1928, 68 L.N.T.S. I and the Treaty of International Procedural
Law, March 19, 1940, cited in 37 A. J. INT'L L. 116 (Supp. 1943). Likewise, the
Convention was not adopted until 1970, after the United States delegation to the
1958 drafting recommended against adoption. See note 34 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of American treaty policy concerning arbitration from
1920-1946 see Sullivan, United States Treaty Policy on Commercial Arbitration-1920-1946 in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 35 (M. Domke ed. 1958).
29. See Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognitionand Enforcement of ForeignArbitralAwards, 70 YALE
L.J. 1049 (1961).
30. Treaty with Republic of China on Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation,
Nov. 4, 1946, 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871.
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including bilateral arbitration clauses in its treaties of friendship,
commerce, and navigation (FCN treaties) . 3 1 These arbitration
clauses 32 attempt to eliminate discrimination against awards rendered in the contracting country but do not seek to change the
country's internalpolicy toward arbitration. This conception of the
purpose of arbitration clauses fits nicely into the United States
federal-state dichotomy but leaves arbitral awards subject to the
willingness of the other nation to accept arbitration. The 1958
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards3 alleviates many of the problems in the previous multilateral and bilateral approaches. 4 The Convention requires not
31. The United States presently has eighteen of these treaties containing arbitration clauses. These include treaties with France, West Germany, Japan, Italy,
and Israel. For a discussion of the bilateral approach to arbitration enforcement

see Walker, Commercial Arbitration-1946-1957in
ARBITRATION 49 (M. Domke ed. 1958).

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

32. A typical provision reads:
Contracts entered into between nationals and companies of either Party
and nationals and companies of the other Party, that provide for the settlement by arbitration of controversies, shall not be deemed unenforceable
within the territories of such other Party merely on the grounds that the
place designated for the arbitration proceedings is outside such territories
or that the nationality of one or more of the arbitrators is not that of such
other Party. No award duly rendered pursuant to any such contract, and
final and enforceable under the laws of the place where rendered, shall be
deemed invalid or denied effective means of enforcement by the authorities
of either Party merely on the grounds that the place where such award was
rendered is outside the territories of such Party or that the nationality of
one or more of the arbitrators is not that of such Party.
Treaty of Friendship, Establishment, and Navigation between the United States
and Belgium, art. I(6), 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432. For a comparison
among variations in these arbitration clauses see Quigley, Accession by the
United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignArbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1051 (1961).
33. As of January, 1975, forty-two nations had acceded to the Convention.
These included France, West Germany, Egypt, Japan, Sweden, and the Soviet
Union. A major holdout is the United Kingdom, which has importance not only
as a major trading nation, but also because London is the site of much arbitration.
Thus, a state, like the United States, accepting the Convention with territorial
reservation as to reciprocity in the place where the award was rendered (see note
42 infra and accompanying text) would not enforce awards made in London. Of
course, other agreements may provide for the recognition and enforcement of the
arbitral awards handed down in non-signatory states.
34. The president of the 1958 United Nations conference listed five advantages which the Convention had over previous arbitration treaties: (a) Wider
definition of awards to which the Convention applied; (b) Reduced and simplified
requirements with which the party seeking recognition or enforcement would have
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only non-discrimination but also liberalization of a signatory's
approach to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. To accomplish
this, the Convention places the burden of proof on the party opposing enforcement of the award, 35 limits the defenses which can be
raised against enforcement of an award, 3 and simplifies the requirements with which the party seeking enforcement must comply. " However, certain areas remain within the discretion of either
the contracting parties 38 or the courts where enforcement is
sought. 9 The United States, for the same policy reasons discussed
to comply; (c) The burden of proof is placed on the party opposing the award;
(d) Parties have greater freedom in the choice of the arbitral authority and the
arbitral procedure; (e) The authority before which enforcement sought has the
right to order the opposing party to give suitable security. U.N. Doc. E/Conf.
26/SR. 25, at 2 (1958).
35. Art. V(1) provides that "recognition and enforcement of the award may
be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that
party furnishes . . . proof. .. ."
36. Art. V provides the following possible defenses: "(a) The parties to the
agreement. . . were, under the law applicable to them under some incapacity or
the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected
it or. . . under the law of the country where the award was made; (b) The party
against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitration or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable
to present his case; (c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or
not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. . . ; (d) The
composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; (e) The
award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made." Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award
may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recogniton
and enforcement are sought finds that: "(a) The subject matters of the difference
are not capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of that country; (b)
The recognition of enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country."
37. Art. IV requires that the party seeking recognition or enforcement supply:
"(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof; (b)
The original agreement or a duly certified copy; (c) If the award or agreement is
not made in an official language of the country in which enforcement is sought,
the party shall supply a translation of these documents into an official language.
The translation must be certified."
38. The contracting parties may determine the place of arbitration, arbitration procedures to be followed, and the scope of arbitration subject to the limitations set out in note 36 supra.
39. The enforcing court has discretion as to the public policy limits on awards,
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earlier, refused to accede to the Convention until 197040 when Congress implemented the Convention through the addition of a second chapter to the 1925 Act,4 although this accession was modified
by the two reservations provided for in the Convention.12 The
United States Supreme Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culve, 3 gave
further impetus to the recognition of foreign arbitration by upholding an arbitration clause in a dispute involving securities subject
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.11 The Court in Scherk
stressed that an international agreement to arbitrate creates differthe due process requirements, and the appropriate subjects for arbitration. See
note 30 supra.
40. The United States delegation to the 1958 conference recommended
"strongly" that the United States not sign or adhere to the convention. The
delegation summarized its reasons as follows: (a) The Convention, if accepted on
a basis that avoids conflict with state laws and judicial procedures, will confer
no meaningful advantages on the United States; (b) The Convention, if accepted
on a basis that assures such advantage, will override the arbitration laws of a
substantial number of states and entail changes in state and possibly federal
court procedures; (c) The United States lacks a sufficient domestic legal basis for
acceptance of an advanced international convention on this subject matter; (d)
The Convention embodies principles of arbitration law which it would not be
desirable for the United States to endorse. Quigley, Accession by the United
States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
ForeignArbitralAwards, 70 YALE L.J. 1074 n.108 (1961).
41. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1975). One commentator has analyzed three developments which made United States accession to the Convention possible: (a) Interpretation of the 1925 Act as creating national substantive law (see notes 13-16
supra and accompanying text); (b) Enactment by a majority of American states
of arbitration statutes overruling the common law rule of revocability of arbitration agreements; (c) Development of more ample legal precedent to indicate our
courts will enforce foreign arbitral awards. Aksen, American ArbitrationAccession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius, in NEW STRATEGIES FOR PEACEFUL REsOLUTION
OF INTERNATIONAL BUsINESs DIsPuTEs 41 (Am. Aribtration Ass'n ed. 1971).
42. Art. 1(3) provides that "any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare
that it will apply the Convention to

. .

. awards made only in the territory of

another Contracting State. It may also declare that it will apply the Convention
only to differences arising out of legal relationships whether contractual or not,
which are considered as commercial under the national law of the State making
such declaration." See Letter of Accession from President Nixon to United Nations, Sept. 1, 1970 in NEW STRATEGIES FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUtrON OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DiSPuTEs 72. Although limiting the Convention's scope somewhat, these reservations should not hinder the effectiveness of the Convention to
any great degree.
43. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
44. The Scherk decision is in conflict with an earlier court decision, Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), that held an agreement to arbitrate unenforceable
under the terms of § 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1970).
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ent concerns than a purely domestic contract.45
The instant court immediately recognized that the Convention's
basic thrust is to liberalize procedures for enforcing foreign arbitral
awards and, therefore, accepted the Convention's placement of the
burden of proof on the party opposing enforcement." In dealing
with petitioner's defenses, the court complied with this proenforcement policy, relying on Scherk's rejection of parochial views
as a basis for refusing to enforce a foreign arbitral award.4 7 The
court did not accept petitioner's equation of public policy with
national political policy, reasoning that a public policy defense
defined by the vagaries of international politics would seriously
undermine the Convention's utility. The court concluded that a
public policy argument would be an adequate defense only when
enforcement would violate the forum nation's fundamental notions
of morality and justice.48 Responding to petitioner's defense of nonarbitrability, the court acknowledged that certain categories of
claims were non-arbitrable because of special United States interests in judicial resolution." Nevertheless, merely because an issue
of national interest colors a dispute, the dispute is not necessarily
within a non-arbitrable category. Thus, the court held that incidental United States national interests in the arbitration did not
make the case non-arbitrable." The court viewed petitioner's
claim of an inadequate opportunity to present its defense in the
arbitral forum as requiring analysis under United States concepts
of due process. Noting that an agreement to arbitrate entails disadvantages as well as advantages, and upholding the arbitration
45. The Court relied on the decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (1972), which upheld a forum selection clause absent a strong showing

that it should be set aside. The Court in Scherk called an agreement to arbitrate
a specialized kind of forum selection clause. 417 U.S. at 519.

46. 508 F.2d at 973. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
47. 417 U.S. at 520 n.15.
48. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117, comment c at
340 (1971).
49. The Court, by way of example, suggested that an American court might
refuse to enforce the arbitral award of an antitrust claim because antitrust matters are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the judiciary. 508 F.2d at 974. In

reference to the Scherk differentiation between domestic and international
agreements (see note 45 supra and accompanying text), the Court left open the
possibility that categories of non-arbitrability might be narrowed if an interna-

tional agreement was in issue.
50. The Court analogized the instant case to Scherk, which was said to have
a more prominent public aspect (regulation of securities), thereby compelling the

conclusion that the instant case was arbitrable.
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tribunal's discretion in declining to reschedule a hearing for the
convenience of petitioner's witness, the court found petitioner's
due process rights were in no way infringed by the arbitration
tribunal's process and decision. Moving to petitioner's defense that
the arbitral forum exceeded its jurisdiction, the court found that
both the Convention's purposes and American case law51 create a

strong presumption, not overcome by petitioner, that an arbitral
tribunal has acted within its powers. The petitioner could not overcome this presumption because, as the court stated, it was "not
apparent" 5- that the scope of the agreement to arbitrate had been
exceeded. While not deciding whether a defense of manifest disregard of the law obtains in a judicial review of an international
arbitration award, 53 the court nonetheless rejected this defense of
petitioner by claiming that extensive judicial review of an arbitral
award would frustrate the basic purpose of arbitration, i.e., quick,
inexpensive resolution of disputes without resort to courtroom litigation. 4 Thus, by imposing a narrow construction on the five defenses, the court sought to uphold the Convention's purpose of
rendering international arbitration awards enforceable in courts of
law.
With this initial interpretation of the Convention, the instant
court has diminished the problem of enforcing foreign arbitral
awards in the United States. As transnational commerce grows, so
the damage increases when disputes paralyze the flow of goods and
services. Businessmen have long advocated arbitration as a means
of making disputes less costly by avoiding lengthy, expensive
courtroom litigation, which too often in international disputes in51. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)
(question of interpretation of collective bargaining agreement is a question for the
arbitrator); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1972) (arbitration clauses to be construed liberally with doubts to be resolved in favor of

arbitration).
52. 363 U.S. at 598.
53. The 1925 Act, specifically § 10, has been construed to include an implied
defense when an arbitral award is in manifest disregard of the law. Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953); Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc.,
375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1967). Article V of the Convention, however, makes its
defenses exclusive. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. The defense of
manifest disregard, therefore, may not be applicable to awards covered by the
Convention.
54. In its decision, the Court refused to increase damages, which allegedly had
been erroneously computed. The Court also declined to impose double costs on
petitioner for a frivolous appeal. The Court considered the appeal a reasonable
exploration of the statute implementing the Convention.
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volves a cauldron of strange laws and suspect treatment of foreigners. But despite the instant court's enforcement of the arbitration
award, the decision reveals some of the pitfalls that businessmen
may yet encounter in arbitration pursuant to the Convention. The
Convention leaves much discretion to the forum state, such as the
interpretation of public policy and due process, in the determination of proper subject matter for arbitration, and in the two reservations relating to the place of arbitration and the requirement of
a dispute in commerce. Certain problems, such as where to arbitrate and arbitral procedure, can be minimized by careful draftsmanship of the arbitration clause. 5 The degree to which the signatory states adhere to the purpose of the Convention-the ready
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards-will determine the Convention's success. With many areas still left, perhaps necessarily,
to national policy, the Convention will not completely alleviate the
problems involved in the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
Perhaps the ideal solution to these problems would be standardization of arbitration laws,56 but agreement by disparate nations on
the many questions of procedural and substantive law comprising
the arbitration process is not a presently foreseeable possibility.
The Convention, by urging the enforceability of arbitral awards,
helps create an atmosphere in which arbitration is regarded as the
logical and viable method for international commercial dispute
resolution. Knowing that awards will be enforced, parties will be
encouraged to turn to arbitration more frequently and knowledgeably and will comply more readily with an arbitrator's decision.
Although aimed at effecting uniform enforcement litigation, the
Convention ultimately enhances the authority of the arbitrator's
decision and prevents post-arbitral litigation.
Clark Mervis
55. For a discussion of the critical points in the drafting of the arbitration
clause see Quigley, Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 58 A.B.A.J. 821
(1972).
56. Contini, International Commercial Arbitration, 8 AM. J. Cohip. L. 308
(1959).

